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Illinois Public Pension Reform: What’s Past
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I. INTRODUCTION
In December 2013, after three years of contentious debate, the Illinois General
Assembly enacted sweeping pension legislation via Public Act 98-0599 to reduce
the pension benefits of current and retired teachers, State and university
employees, legislators, and elected State officials.[1] The legislation—which was
the culmination of events beginning in 2010, when the legislature lowered the
benefits of employees hired after January 1, 2011[2]—broke a political stalemate
over competing bills and views on how to address the State’s underfunded pension
systems.[3]
The 2013 legislation was also the product of aggressive lobbying efforts by Illinois’
business community, principally the Commercial Club of Chicago (the “Club”), to
cut the benefits of current and retired employees.[4] Although the Club recognized
that the State’s failure to properly fund the State-funded pension systems was the
primary cause of those systems’ underfunding,[5] the Club stated it would be
“unfair to require taxpayers to bear the costs of the current pension programs for
the State’s employees.”[6] As Eden Martin, then-Club President, stated to Club
members, paying these obligations was politically unpalatable because “State
Government couldn’t cut—and nobody could stand the thought of a tax
increase.”[7] Ty Fahner, Martin’s successor, put it even more bluntly: “[I]t is
fundamentally unfair to ask 95 percent of us—all of those who are not in one of the
State’s five pension systems—to pay for the 5 percent who benefit from those
plans.”[8]
Public employees and retirees, however, have a much different perspective and
view Public Act 98-0599 and other unilateral efforts to cut benefits as morally and
legally irresponsible.[9] They point out that “almost 80% of [public sector]
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workers are ineligible for Social Security, making pensions their only reliable
means of retirement security.”[10] They note that the State’s unfunded pension
liabilities are not their fault because they have historically paid their fair share of
the normal cost of benefits through payroll deductions.[11] If fault must be
assigned, then they contend it is well-established that fault principally rests with
past governors and General Assemblies that, for decades, used the moneys the
State should have contributed to the pension system to fund public services, such
as education, healthcare, and public safety, and stave off the need for tax increases,
services cuts or both.[12]
In other words, the State’s underfunding of the pension system has, for decades,
served as a proverbial credit card that benefitted taxpayers and elected officials
alike by relieving them of (i) the short term burden of tax increases, service cuts or
both, and (ii) the long term burden of fixing a State fiscal system that generates
insufficient revenue to pay for public services and cover the State’s actuariallyrequired pension contributions.[13] As a result, public employees and retirees
contend that the State cannot repudiate its pension obligations simply because
meeting those obligations now presents the State with politically and economically
difficult choices.[14]
This Article chronicles the history of public pension funding in Illinois to give
proper context to the Illinois Constitution’s Pension Clause, the General
Assembly’s recent legislation, and the pending legal challenges to that
legislation. To that end, the Article first considers the causes of the State’s
underfunded pension systems. It then provides an overview of the Illinois
Constitution’s Pension Clause, which presents a significant legal obstacle to the
legislation. Against this backdrop, the Article summarizes and discusses the main
provisions of Public Act 98-0599. It then provides an update on the five lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of Public Act 98-0599 pending in the Circuit
Court of Sangamon County, Illinois as of September 2014. Finally, the Article
offers concluding comments on three main legal issues involving the
constitutionality of Public Act 98-0599: (1) whether the 3% compounded cost of
living adjustment (or “COLA”) that is part of a person’s base pension qualifies as a
protected “benefit” under the Pension Clause; (2) whether persons receiving a
pension before the 3% compounded COLA became law in August 1989 could claim
that the COLA rate increase is a protected “benefit”; and (3) whether the Pension
Clause is subject to a police or reserved powers exception. As detailed below, the
Pension Clause, as with other constitutional prohibitions and positive mandates
found in the Illinois Constitution, does not yield to claims of necessity, and the
likelihood that Public Act 98-0599 will pass legal muster is remote at best.

SUMMER 2014

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

5

II. ILINOIS’ LONG HISTORY OF UNDERFUNDING PUBLIC
PENSIONS
A.

State and Municipal Pension Funds Were Chronically Underfunded
Long Before the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention

For public officials and the general public, Illinois’ underfunded State and
municipal pension systems are a well-known problem and hardly a surprise. What
is surprising, however, is how long the lack of proper funding has been the primary
cause of that problem. The discussion that follows reviews the history of that
problem.
In 1917, in a report commissioned by the General Assembly, the Illinois Pension
Laws Commission described the condition of the State and municipal pension
systems as “one of insolvency” and “moving toward crisis” because the “financial
provisions [were] entirely inadequate for paying the stipulated pensions when
due.”[15] The Commission recommended that the General Assembly adopt a
“reserve plan” whereby the amount needed to pay pensions when due “should be
set aside at the time service is rendered” by the State and municipalities so “each
generation of taxpayers pays its own obligations for services rendered.”[16]
In 1919, in a subsequent report, the Commission reiterated this conclusion,
detailed how the “reserve plan” would operate, and reviewed the legal protections
provided to public pensions in Illinois and elsewhere.[17] That legal analysis
found, in part, that pension benefits were gratuities, and that pension funds were
not held in trust to pay pension amounts due, but could be devoted to other
purposes.[18] Interestingly, concerns over the State and municipalities raiding the
pension funds to spend the moneys on other purposes later led the delegates to the
1922 Illinois Constitutional Convention to include a provision that would prohibit
such action, as a first attempt to protect pension benefits constitutionally.[19] The
proposed 1922 Constitution, though, was rejected by voters and not adopted.[20]
Decades later, in 1945, the General Assembly created the Illinois Public Employees
Pension Laws Commission to again study the financial condition of State and
municipal pension systems and to advise the legislature and the public on trends,
best practices, and proposed changes to those systems.[21] From 1947 through
1969, the Pension Commission issued a series of biennial reports with dire
warnings of the pension systems’ impending insolvency, the growth of unfunded
pension liabilities, and the significant burden these liabilities posed for “present
and future generations of taxpayers.”[22] The Commission observed that
“[p]ension obligations [were] not contingent or speculative” but “fixed debts which
ultimately must be paid.”[23] The Commission stated that the size of these
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obligations would place a great demand on future tax revenues and needed to be
considered in concert with “budgetary needs for other governmental functions and
services which [were] steadily increasing.”[24] In both its 1965 and 1969 reports,
the Commission further stated that these obligations rested “exclusively upon
government as the employer” and “must be met by public funds derived from
future taxation.”[25]
The Commission reported that the unfunded liabilities were primarily due to
inadequate pension contributions made by the State and municipalities as public
employers.[26] In a statement to Governor William Stratton in 1957, the
Commission stated: “[w]hereas many states, particularly those adjoining the State
of Illinois, have provided for full or substantially complete funding of pension
plans, Illinois has been woefully derelict in this regard.”[27] The Commission
observed in its 1955 report that the State appropriations to the five State pension
funds had “fallen far short of full funding requirements” because of “increased
demands upon the State for essential services in many areas.”[28] In reports from
both 1961 and 1969, the Commission further observed that these appropriations
were “arbitrary,” “grossly insufficient,” and “below mandatory statutory
requirements as expressly provided in the governing laws.”[29] Indeed, in 1969,
the Commission declared that Illinois stood “foremost in the United States in the
maintenance and perpetuation of an inherently unsound and unworkable policy of
administration for its public employees.”[30]
As a consistent and repeated recommendation beginning in 1947, the Commission
stated it was “imperative” that the State and municipalities budget and fund their
pension costs as employees rendered service, and that the General Assembly enact
actuarially-sound funding requirements to retire existing and future
liabilities.[31] In the Commission’s view, there was “no short cut method to
financing pensions.”[32] This recommendation, however, went unheeded by the
General Assembly partially because of “the unwarranted objections of certain civic
organizations to the allocation of proper revenues” to the pension funds.[33]
The Commission found it “regrettable” that despite the obvious relationship
existing between governmental finance and the pension obligations, “public
officials still fail[ed] or refuse[d] to recognize that pension obligations have a direct
and immediate relationship to the entire fiscal structure of their respective
government units.”[34] As early as 1957, the Commission asked rhetorically: “[i]f
the State of Illinois and the local governments are today resisting the full or
substantial financing of pension obligations under present conditions of economic
prosperity, [then] how much more unfavorable will be the financial status of the
funds when the obligations mature in greater proportions and the economic
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conditions may not be as promising?”[35] The Commission later remarked that it
“would be unfortunate indeed if the pension expectancies of thousands of
employees and dependents are impaired in the future because of the present policy
of government to defer costs.”[36] The Commission cautioned that “this is
precisely what may occur if required changes [were] not made to provide for
financing the pension funds in accordance with their accruing requirements.”[37]
In addition to studying the financial status of the State and municipal pension
funds, the Commission contrasted (i) Illinois’ treatment of pension as “gratuities”
with (ii) other states’ protection of public pension benefits under a contractual
theory throughstate constitutional provisions or court decisions.[38] The
Commission explained in its 1961 report that benefits deemed “gratuities” created
“no contractual rights for the members” and “no vested rights in the continuance
of the plan or in the maintenance of any particular benefit schedule” because the
plan and its benefit terms rested “entirely within the discretion of the legislative
body that created them.”[39]
By 1969, the Commission reported that the General Assembly Retirement System
(GARS) was 68.5% funded, while the State University Retirement System (SURS)
was 47% funded.[40] The remaining three funds were funded at the following
percentages: State Employees Retirement System (SERS) 43%; Judicial
Retirement System (JRS) 32.3%; and Teachers Retirement System (TRS)
40%.[41] Overall, the five State pension systems were 41.8% funded in 1969, while
today the systems are similarly 41.1% funded as noted on Chart 1 below.[42]
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As noted in Chart 2 below, in 1970, the five State pension systems had unfunded
liabilities of $1.46 billion, whereas the systems presently have $97.4 billion in
unfunded liabilities.
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In addition, in 1969, the downstate police and firemen pension funds were
respectively funded at 33.8% and 19.1%[43]The City of Chicago’s five pension
funds were funded at the following percentages: Police (34.6%); Firemen (50.6%);
Laborers (81.9%); Municipal Employees (56.9%); and Teachers (32.7%).[44]
It was against this background that the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention
(“Convention”) convened in Springfield between December 8, 1969 and September
3, 1970, prompting the delegates to add the Pension Clause to the Illinois
Constitution.[45] As the Illinois Supreme Court recently observed, the delegates
were “mindful that in the past, appropriations to cover state pension obligations
had ‘been made a political football’ and ‘the party in power would just use the
amount of the state contribution to help balance budgets,’ jeopardizing the
resources available to meet the State obligations to participants in its pension
systems in the future.”[46]
As a result, one of the purposes of the Clause was to bar the State from relying on
the consequences of its failure to properly fund the pension system as a basis for
cutting or repudiating it pension obligations.[47] Delegate Green, one of the
Clause’s two principal sponsors, explained how in 1964 the New Jersey Supreme
Court rejected constitutional protection of pension benefits under a contractual
theory and upheld a statute unilaterally cutting the benefits of police and
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firefighters because of chronic underfunding and insufficient assets to pay both
present and future retirees.[48] Delegate Green pointed out that New Jersey’s
underfunding occurred because State contributions to its pension systems “were
not related to the ultimate cost of pension benefits,” just like in Illinois.[49] What
happened in New Jersey, according to Delegate Green, “[was] basically what the
people of Illinois—or the public employees of Illinois—are very fearful of.”[50]
B.

Chronic Underfunding Continued After The Pension Clause’s Adoption
in 1970

After the Pension Clause’s adoption, the Commission continued to report on the
precarious status of the pension systems until it was abolished in 1984 and its
duties transferred to the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission.[51] As with its
reports prior to 1970, the Pension Commission reported that “[c]ontributions by
governmental employers [were] still below the level which might be considered
adequate for the accruing requirements of the pension funds.”[52] The
Commission reiterated that its “primary concern” was the imperative need for “a
realistic financial policy, consistent with recognized principles on the part of both
the State of Illinois and the local governments which will produce adequate
revenues for the financial needs of these funds.”[53]
The Commission explained that for over 30 years it had advocated actuarial
funding of the public retirement systems and insisted that “the State pay not only
its share of the current service cost but additional amounts which would amortize
the unfunded liability over a period of 30 or 40 years.”[54] The Commission noted
that because reaching “100% funding was probably impossible to attain . . . it
recommended funding at a two-thirds level in the belief that a one-third unfunded
liability would be manageable in terms of future State appropriations as annual
payout obligations increased.”[55] The Commission stated that “[w]hen legislative
and executive indifference or hostility prevented implementation of this modified
funding principle,” it recommended the State pension contributions meet current
service costs plus interest on the unfunded accrued liability to preclude further
growth in that liability and to moderate the State’s subsequent annual payment
obligations.[56] The Commission further stated that while this recommendation
was codified in 1967 as the statutory funding plan for the State Universities
Retirement System, the State failed to follow that funding plan as well as the
statutory funding requirements for the other State-supported pension
funds.[57] That failure, according to the Commission, was “largely, though not
exclusively, responsible for the increasing level of unfunded accrued
liabilities.”[58]
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Undaunted, the Commission continued to advocate through the 1970s and 1980s
that the State and municipalities budget and fund their obligations as employees
rendered service and in line with actuarially sound principles by paying the
“normal cost plus interest” on unfunded liabilities.[59] Under this funding
approach, the State and municipalities, as public employers, would make
contributions covering the current cost of benefits accrued by employees each year
(i.e., “normal cost”) as well as the cost associated with the interest due on unfunded
liabilities (i.e., “plus interest on unfunded liability”).[60] Under this funding
approach, unfunded liabilities would not be reduced, but would remain a fixed
amount that would “shrink as a percentage of payroll or total liabilities.”[61] The
Commission explained that “this is approach is considered to be acceptable for
public retirement systems where permanence can be taken for granted and full
funding is not regarded as essential.”[62]
The Commission cautioned once more that at some point the “cost requirements
for pension may become too burdensome to government,” in which case it may be
“necessary to limit services of government or reduce pension payouts.”[63] The
Commission noted, however, that a “reduction of pension payouts or established
pension commitments may be difficult or impossible” under the Pension
Clause.[64] The Commission explained that the Clause “created a contractual
vested right in public employee pensions” that “may not be diminished or
impaired.”[65] The Commission further explained that under the Clause, “[o]nce
a bill is enacted providing for increased pension credits and improved benefits, a
definite legal obligation is established which cannot be removed or repealed.”[66]
Accordingly, the Commission sharply criticized the funding policy the legislature
began using in Fiscal Year 1973 to fund the State’s five pension systems.[67] Under
that policy, the General Assembly made employer contributions to the systems
equal to 100% of what the systems were expected to “pay-out” in benefits each
year. Under the “100% payout” policy, State pension contributions matched
benefit payment amounts while “leaving employee contributions to at least
stabilize, if not decrease, the systems’ future unfunded liabilities.”[68] The
Commission called the “payout” policy “unacceptable since it result[ed] in a
deferment of the burden of financing currently incurred benefit obligations to
future generations of taxpayers” and “appreciably greater costs to
government.”[69]
Rubin Cohn, a long-time Commission member, explained in the Commission’s
1975-1977 report that the “payout” policy was flawed because benefit payouts were
expected to sharply increase in future years.[70] As Cohn put it, “it requires an
article of faith to believe that these enormous annual pension requirements will be
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met from revenue increases occasioned by normal economic growth even as
supplemented by new or increased State taxes and that they will reflect a
reasonable percentage of the State’s budget needs for all State purposes.”[71] Cohn
found this prospect unlikely, especially since “[n]either candidate for governor in
1976, nor candidates for legislative office proposed new taxes or an increase in
existing taxes” to meet a $50 million shortfall in education funding based on a $10
billion State budget.[72] The only way to avoid such a “crushing” burden on
taxpayers was for the legislature to adopt an actuarially sound funding
policy.[73] To not adopt such a policy would ultimately lead to the “progressive
depletion of the system and its ultimate insolvency and bankruptcy.”[74]
In 1979, Governor Jim Thompson’s administration echoed Cohn’s concerns in a
report prepared for his office by an outside consultant examining the State’s
pension system.[75] The report stated that financing Illinois’ pension obligations
had “reached crisis proportions” because funding benefit payouts had “increased
dramatically in recent years.”[76] The report noted that “Moody’s and Standard
and Poor’s have expressed concern regarding the continuing increase of unfunded
pension liabilities in Illinois,” and that Illinois would jeopardize its “AAA bond
rating” if “the unfunded liability is not stabilized.”[77] As with the Commission, the
report recommended that the State adopt the “normal cost plus interest” funding
approach, but phase it in to accommodate other budgetary objectives.[78]
Despite these warnings, the General Assembly used the “payout” policy to fund the
State’s five pension systems in fiscal years 1973 through 1981.[79] Treasurer Judy
Baar Topinka stated in May 2011 that although this funding method “had no
relation to actuarial calculations of liability, it did guarantee a steady increase in
State contributions.”[80] This funding policy, because of higher than expected
investment returns,[81] helped increase the funding ratio of these systems from
41.8% at the time of 1970 Constitutional Convention to 48.6% in 1979 as noted on
Chart 1.[82]
C.

Pension Underfunding Was Further Aggravated During Governor
Thompson’s Tenure

In March 1981, Governor Jim Thompson, however, announced that the State
would abandon the “100% payout” policy in fiscal year 1982 as a “budget savings
measure.”[83] In its place, the State would contribute 60% of the estimated benefit
payouts made by the five State pension systems.[84] Indeed, between fiscal years
1982 and 1995, pegging State pension contributions to at or below 60% of payout
became the State’s de facto funding policy.[85] During that period, “state pension
contributions declined sharply in fiscal years 1982 and 1983 and increased
modestly through fiscal year 1995.”[86] These State contributions were well below
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the employer’s actuarial cost of benefits accrued each year, with contributions
fluctuating between 30% and 66% of actuarial cost.[87] Treasurer Topinka
observed that this policy shift “aggravated” the pension funding problem.[88] The
Chicago Tribune reported that the Thompson administration “rationed spending
on pensions so that scarce state resources could be put toward more pressing and
voter-pleasing needs.”[89] As Governor Thompson’s legislative lobbyist, Jim
Edgar explained: “The state was trying to pay for all these services people wanted
on the cheap.”[90]
In addition to abandoning the “100% payout” policy, Governor Thompson
successfully passed legislation in 1982 that made investment returns the largest
funding source for the pension systems.[91] The legislation was an outgrowth of a
study he commissioned in 1982 recommending that the pension systems be
allowed to make investments under the prudent investor rule, rather than from a
short list of statutorily-approved types of securities, such as government
bonds.[92] The study explained that, “[t] he taxpayers and citizens of the state,
upon whom the ultimate responsibility for financing the [pension] system rests,
have a clear interest in an investment policy that generates maximum resources
and relieves pressure on the tax base to increase contributions.”[93] The study
stated that if the three largest State pension funds “had achieved the same 8.6%
market rate of return as the average U.S. pension fund did in the past five years,
total investments would have been approximately $875 million greater. This could
have been used to reduce the taxpayers’ burden; to provide additional benefits; or,
to increase the overall funding ratio another 8%.”[94] The study also highlighted
how Governor Thompson in 1981 signed into law legislation permitting the State
pension systems to invest in mortgaged-backed securities, and noted the program
established by South Shore Bank of Chicago to assemble and sell packaged
mortgages.[95] The Taxpayers’ Federation of Illinois pointed out, however, that
this shift in investment policy now made the pension systems dependent upon “the
most volatile revenue” source because it directly depends “upon the vagaries of the
economy to a greater degree than” State employer or employee contributions.[96]
In 1985, Governor Thompson convened a task force to investigate the funding
status of the State pension systems and propose an alternative funding method to
replace the 60% payout policy.[97] The task force proposed a new funding policy
requiring the State to pay “vested” pension liabilities over a 40 year basis, but was
viewed as little different from the 60% payout policy.[98] The task force also
considered the impact of pension underfunding on the State’s credit rating and
found that Standard and Poors reduced its rating from AAA to AA+ due to the
State’s “deferral of pension obligations.”[99] Indeed, the report noted that one
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rating agency expressed concern that the State’s pension funding was a potential
“time bomb” for the future.[100]
In 1988, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission determined that staying on
the 60% payout policy would ultimately cut into available revenues for schools,
human services, and other programs.[101] The Fiscal Commission recommended
that the legislature adopt a funding policy requiring the State to pay the normal
cost of benefits when incurred plus an amount needed to pay off the unfunded
liability over 40 years as a level percentage of payroll.[102]
In 1989, the General Assembly enacted a version of this plan to begin in fiscal year
1990.[103] Under that plan, the State’s contribution would be “increased
incrementally over a seven year period so that by FY 1996 the minimum
contribution to be made by the State would be an amount sufficient to meet the
normal cost [of benefits] and amortize the unfunded liability over 40 years, as a
level percentage of payroll.”[104] State Comptroller Dawn Clark Netsch stated that
this plan failed because the governor and legislature never made the
appropriations needed to meet the plan’s funding requirements.[105]
Indeed, between fiscal years 1990 and 1995, over $1.4 billion in moneys needed to
fund the plan were used on other State budget priorities.[106] In testimony before
Congress in 1991, Comptroller Netsch stated that Illinois’ pension problem was
“underfunding” and that “[u]nderappropriated pension contributions [were] like
unpaid credit card bills” that ultimately must be paid.[107] To highlight this point,
Netsch noted how the legislature permitted Governor Jim Edgar to divert $21
million from moneys otherwise automatically transferred into the State’s pension
system to the State’s General Revenue Fund for expenditure on other State
programs.[108] She added that, “[o]ur problems might be more understandable if
our retirement systems provided extravagant benefits, but they do not. We are
having trouble facing our obligations for systems that have some of the lowest
benefit levels in the county.”[109] By 1994, the systems’ unfunded liabilities had
grown from $8.2 billion in 1989 to $17 billion (See Chart 2) and the systems’
funding percentage dropped from 60% to 54% (See Chart 1).
D.

The 1995 Funding Plan By Design Increased Unfunded Pension
Liabilities

In 1994, the health and underfunding of the State’s pension systems became a
significant political issue for Governor Jim Edgar in his bid for re-election.[110] In
February 1994, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission reported that
because of insufficient State contributions and not following the 1989 funding
plan, the General Assembly Retirement System (GARS) was selling assets to cover

SUMMER 2014

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

15

benefit payments to annuitants.[111] The Fiscal Commission stated that, if the
State’s inadequate funding practices continued, GARS would be insolvent by fiscal
year 2008 and the financial status of the State’s four other pension systems would
begin to rapidly deteriorate in fiscal year 2013.[112] State Comptroller Netsch, the
Democratic candidate for Governor, severely criticized Edgar for not adhering to
the 1989 pension funding plan and labeled him a “charge-and-spend bureaucrat”
who put “our massive pension deficit on the state’s credit card.”[113]
In response, Edgar unveiled in his budget address a fifty year pension funding plan
that would phase in increased State pension contributions over the first twenty
years and ultimately achieve 90% funding in fiscal year 2045.[114] Netsch
countered with her own plan with a 10 year phase in of increased State
contributions and stated that Edgar’s plan would add $38 billion more to the State
unfunded pension liabilities.[115] Edgar replied that his plan was “affordable”
while Netsch’s plan called for additional pension funding the State needed for
education and child welfare programs.[116]
In June 1994, the General Assembly and Governor Edgar reached an agreement
on a new pension funding plan modeled after Edgar’s proposal beginning in
1995.[117] The 1995 funding plan was later signed into law as Public Act 88-593 in
August 1994.[118] The legislation created a 50-year plan to achieve 90% funding
of the State’s five pension systems by fiscal year 2045.[119] The legislation
included a 15-year ramp-up period of increasing pension contributions so the State
could adapt to the increased financial commitment.[120] At the end of that period
in fiscal year 2010, the State’s contributions would remain at a level percentage of
payrolls for thirty-five years until reaching 90% funding in fiscal year
2045.[121] When the plan began in 1995, the State’s pension systems were
significantly underfunded with almost $20 billion in unfunded liabilities and a
funding ratio of 53%.[122]
In its March 2013 Order, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”),
found that rather than “controlling the State’s growing pension burden,” the 1995
plan by design “increased the unfunded liability, underfunded the State’s pension
obligations, and deferred pension funding.”[123] “This resulting underfunding of
the pension systems enabled the State to shift the burden associated with its
pension costs to the future and, as a result, created significant financial stress and
risks for the State.”[124] The SEC noted that unfunded liabilities grew because a
majority of the State contributions required under the plan “were not sufficient to
cover both (1) the cost of pension benefits earned by public employees by virtue of
their service in the current year (“the normal cost”) and (2) a payment to amortize”
past unfunded liabilities.[125] Indeed, in 2006, John Filan, as Director of
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Governor Blagojevich’s Office of Management and Budget, testified before a
subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives that the 1995 plan was
intended to underfund the pension systems and not pay normal costs and interest
on the unfunded liability until 2034.[126]
In addition, the SEC found that the General Assembly compounded this problem
by enacting “Pension Holidays” lowering already deficient contribution amounts
in 2006 and 2007, and not increasing contributions in 2008 through 2010 to offset
these reductions.[127] The SEC observed that from 1996 to 2010 “the State’s
unfunded liability increased by $57 billion” with insufficient State contributions as
the “primary driver of this increase.”[128] This underfunding, the SEC noted, “also
compromised the creditworthiness of the State and increases the State’s financing
costs.”[129] Taken together, the SEC found that because of the State’s failure to
adhere to the 1995 plan’s 15-year ramp period, “the State should have known that
it likely would have significant difficulty making required contributions in the
future.”[130]
E.

The Lack of Proper Pension Funding Stems From A Flawed Fiscal
System

In 2009, the General Assembly’s Pension Modernization Task Force answered the
important question of why proper pension funding was not forthcoming.[131] The
Task Force found that: “[t]he State’s failure to make its required contributions to
the five pension systems can be traced to one, simple cause: a State fiscal system
that is so poorly designed that it failed for decades to generate enough revenue
growth both to maintain service levels from one year to the next, and cover the
State’s actuarially-required employer contribution to its five pension
systems.”[132] The Task Force further found:
This ongoing ‘structural deficit’ imposed a tough fiscal/political choice on State
elected officials—fully fund pensions and cut services, or skip a portion of the
pension payment and maintain as many services as possible. Not wanting to
implement cuts in spending on these services (or enact revenue increases), the
legislature and various governors elected to instead divert revenue from making
the required employer pension contribution to maintain services like education,
healthcare, public safety and caring for disadvantaged populations. Effectively,
the State used the pension systems as a credit card to fund ongoing service
operations.[133]
Indeed, in June 2013, the Commission on Government Forecasting and
Accountability (“COGFA”), testified before the First Conference Committee to
Public Act 98-0599 and detailed the factors that caused the $87 billion growth in
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unfunded pension liabilities between fiscal years 1985 and 2012.[134] COGFA’s
analysis revealed that 47% of that growth (or $41.2 billion) came from the State
not paying what it should have to the pension systems.[135] Stock market losses,
the next single largest cause, accounted for 16.5% (or $14.4 billion) of that
growth.[136] COGFA found that changes in actuarial assumptions, such as people
living longer than expected, caused 10.1% (or $8.8 billion) of that
growth.[137] Benefit increases for public employees only accounted for 9.3% (or
$8.1 billion) of the growth.[138] And employee salary increases were less than
expected over that period and actually helped reduce those unfunded liabilities by
.6% (or $535 million).[139]
In short, pension benefit increases and employee salary increases were not the
main reasons why the State’s five pension systems are so underfunded. Nor can
the pension systems’ underfunding be blamed primarily on stock market losses or
faulty assumptions that underestimated increased lifespans. Rather, the problem
stems primarily from the General Assembly’s failure to fund the system—a
problem that was long-standing and well-known in 1970 and was the reason why
the Pension Clause was adopted.[140]
III. THE SCOPE OF THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION’S PENSION
CLAUSE
The Pension Clause of the Illinois Constitution presents a serious legal obstacle to
any efforts by the General Assembly to unilaterally alter the pension benefits of
current employees and retirees. The Clause provides that: “Membership in any
pension or retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school
district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.”[141] The Clause is based on and nearly identical to a provision found
in the New York Constitution.[142]
According to Illinois Supreme Court and Appellate Court decisions, the Pension
Clause bars the General Assembly from unilaterally reducing the pension benefit
rights of current employees as well as retirees.[143] The Pension Clause does this
by safeguarding, as of when a person joins a public pension system, not only the
benefit rights contained in the Illinois Pension Code,[144] but also all other
benefits that are “limited to, conditioned on, and flow directly from membership
in one of the State’s various public pension systems,” including subsidized health
care.[145] The Clause’s protection also extends to employee contribution
rates and any benefit increases added during an employee’s term of service.[146]
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As to funding, while the Clause does not require the State to fund the pension
system at a specific funding percentage, it does mandate that pensions will be paid
when they become due.[147] Put differently, the Clause is “aimed at protecting the
right to receive the promised retirement benefits, not the adequacy of the funding
to pay them.”[148] The Clause, according to the Illinois Supreme Court, “was
intended to force the funding of pensions indirectly, by putting the state and
municipal governments on notice that they are responsible for those benefits.”
[149] The Clause also grants pension recipients a cause of action to compel the
payment of benefits should a pension system default or be on the verge of
default.”[150]
Finally, while the Clause bars the General Assembly from unilaterally reducing
pension benefit rights, these rights are “contractual” in nature.[151] Accordingly,
pension benefit rights can be changed through contract modification principles if
the legislature offers public employees legal consideration and public employees
agree to accept that offer.[152]
IV. PROLOGUE: PUBLIC ACT 98-0599 AND ITS ORIGINS
A.

Background

During its 2013 Spring Session, two pension reform proposals were advanced in
the General Assembly—Senate Bill 1 and Senate Bill 2404. Senate Bill 1, as
amended in the House of Representatives, was sponsored by House Speaker
Michael Madigan,[153] while Senate Bill 2404 was sponsored by Senate President
John Cullerton.[154] Both bills shared the objective of obtaining significant
savings from the State pension systems by reducing the 3% compounded COLA
rate that retirees and employees hired before January 1, 2011 receive under the
Pension Code because that benefit represents the largest component of moneys
paid out by the pension systems to retirees each year.[155]
Each bill, however, took a different approach to achieve its savings against the
backdrop of the Pension Clause. The House proposal, which was set forth in
several amendments to Senate Bill 1, sought to achieve savings through unilateral
cuts to the pension benefits of retirees and current employees. In the opinion of
the Civic Federation of Chicago, the bill would not violate the Pension Clause
because the legislature purportedly retained the power to cut pension benefits to
address the State’s fiscal crisis, preserve the pension system, and protect the public
welfare as detailed in the bill’s preamble.[156] The bill was endorsed by Illinois’
business community, including the Commercial Club of Chicago, and passed the
House by a vote of 62-51-2, but failed to pass the Senate by a vote of 16-42-0.[157]
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Senate Bill 2404, on the other hand, sought to achieve its savings by applying
contract principles of offer, acceptance, and consideration through negotiations
with public sector labor unions.[158] In exchange for agreeing to a lower COLA
rate on their pensions, current employees and retirees were offered, among other
things, a contractually-binding pension funding guarantee by the State, retiree
healthcare access, and legal treatment of all future salary increases as pensionable
income.[159] The bill sought to pass constitutional muster under the Pension
Clause by using contract modification principles as indicated by Illinois court
decisions.[160] Senate Bill 2404 was supported by public sector labor unions,
passed the Senate by a vote of 40-16-0, but was never called for a vote in the
House.[161]
Since neither of these proposals passed both chambers in May 2013, a conference
committee was formed in June 2013 under Senate and House Rules to resolve the
differences between Public Act 98-0599 and Senate Bill 2404. The 10-member
bipartisan, bicameral committee, chaired by Senator Kwame Raoul, held three
public hearings and other meetings throughout the summer and fall of 2013, and
crafted a proposal.
The goal of this proposal was to make benefit changes consistent with how
California courts treat pension benefits—by cutting benefits while offsetting those
cuts with other advantages. The conference committee chose to follow this
approach because it was different than the frameworks used by Senate Bill 1 and
Senate Bill 2404. Under the California approach, the legislation may unilaterally
reduce pension benefits so long as the reductions are reasonable, bear some
material relation to the fiscal integrity of the pension system, and provide affected
participants with offsetting advantages.[162] The Democratic members of the
conference committee offered a proposal in early September 2013, but Republican
committee members opposed it as not providing sufficient savings and benefit
reductions.[163]
Due to that impasse, the four legislative leaders worked to bridge the gap in
November 2013 and fashioned an agreed proposal.[164] The Leaders’ agreement
was set forth as the First Conference Committee Report to Senate Bill 1 and used
the House’s unilateral approach to achieve its goals rather than Senate Bill 2404’s
contractual approach.[165] The proposal passed the General Assembly on
December 3, 2013, and was signed into law as Public Act 98-0599 two days
later.[166] The legality of this approach under the Pension Clause is now pending
in court.
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SUMMARY OF PUBLIC ACT 98-0599’S PROVISIONS
Benefit Changes

The Leaders’ Proposal, as set forth in Public Act 98-0599, makes six major changes
to the pension benefits of current employees hired prior to January 1, 2011 and
existing retirees as detailed below. The pension systems’ actuaries estimate that
because of the Act’s pension benefit reductions and new funding plan, the State
will save over $145 billion over the next 30 years.[167] The Public Act is also
estimated to reduce the pension systems’ existing $97.4 billion unfunded liability
by $21 billion.[168] In addition, the Act is estimated to reduce the State’s fiscal
year 2016 pension contribution by $1.2 billion.[169]
Lower COLA Increases. Under Public Act 98-0599, the current 3% annual
compounded COLA increase on pension income a participant receives is replaced
by a formula that caps increases based on the participant’s years of
service.[170] The formula is as follows: $1000 x years of service x 3% for
participants not coordinated with Social Security;[171] and $800 x years of service
x 3% for participants coordinated with Social Security.[172] The $1000 and $800
figures contained in the formula are annually increased by inflation as determined
by the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics on a compounded
basis.[173] If a participant’s pension income is less than $1000 or $800, as
applicable, multiplied by years of service, then the participant will continue to
receive the 3% compounded COLA increase.


Examples: A retired teacher participating in TRS who worked 30 years will receive
a maximum $900 increase—$1000 x 30 x .03=$900. A retired State agency
employee participating in SERS who worked 30 years will receive a maximum
$720 increase—$800 x 30 x .03=$720.

The goal of the COLA rate change is to allow retirees with lower annual pensions
and longer years of service to continue to receive the 3% compounded increases
they would have received prior to Public Act 98-0599. At the same time, the new
COLA rate caps the increases for retirees with higher pension income amounts and
for those who have fewer years of service.
Skipped COLA Increases. In addition to lowering the COLA rate, Public Act
98-0599 also skips (or withholds) a certain number of COLA increases after
retirement at the new rate for current employees only based on their age as of June
1, 2014.[174] The bill exempts retirees from this provision. The skipped or
withheld COLA increases begin in the participant’s second year in
retirement.[175] COLA increases are also skipped or withheld on a staggered basis,
not in back to back years as detailed below:
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Age 50 or older lose one increase (year two)[176]
Age 49 to 47 lose three increases (years two, four and six of retirement)[177]
Age 46 to 44 lose four increases (years two, four, six and eight of
retirement)[178]
Age 43 and younger will lose five increases (years two, four, six, eight and ten
of retirement)[179]

Retirement Age Increase. Public Act 98-0599 increases the retirement age at
which current employees who are age 45 or younger as of June 1, 2014 are eligible
to receive a pension.[180] For each year an employee is younger than 46, the
retirement age increases by 4 months, but no more than 5 years.[181] For example:
A 40-year-old would need to work two additional years.[182] A 31-year-old would
need to work an additional five years.[183] Public Act 98-0599 does not increase
the retirement age for current employees who are age 46 or older as of June 1,
2014.[184]
Cap on Pensionable Salary. Public Act 98-0599 imposes a cap on the
maximum salary used to determine a current employee’s pensionable income and,
in turn, annual pension.[185] The cap is $110,631, but that amount is increased
each year by the lesser of 3% or one half the rate of inflation as determined by U.S.
Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics.[186] The salary cap provision,
however, does not apply to annualized income exceeding the cap as of June 1, 2014,
or salary based on an existing employment or collective bargaining
agreement.[187] As a result, the salary of a current employee exceeding $110,631
is grandfathered-in and remains pensionable income.[188] Any future salary
increases that employee receives, however, would not be deemed pensionable
income until the salary cap noted above increases and exceeds the employee’s
salary level, unless the increases are built into an existing employment or collective
bargaining agreement.
Money Purchase Plan Changes. For TRS and SURS only, Public Act 98-0599
modifies the formula used to determine a current employee’s base pension amount
when he or she retires under what is known as the “money purchase” formula. The
“money purchase” formula is an alternative to the traditional benefit formula used
to calculate an employee’s base pension amount for employees who began
employment prior to July 1, 2005.[189] An employee is entitled to receive the
highest base pension amount based on the two formulas.[190]
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For SURS participants, the money purchase formula produces the highest base
pension amount the majority of the time. TRS participants typically receive the
highest base pension amount from the traditional benefit formula.
The traditional benefit formula uses an employee’s final average salary amount,
years of service, retirement age, and statutory accrual rate (e.g., 2.2% for each year
of service).[191] For example, a current SURS employee with a final average salary
of $52,500, who worked 25 years, and retired at age 67 would receive an annual
base pension amount of $28,875 under a traditional formula.[192]
The “money purchase” formula is a more complex calculation. [193] The formula
takes the total employee contributions made to the pension system, multiplied by
an interest rate known as the “effective rate of interest” or “regular interest rate”
depending on the employee’s participation in SURS or TRS.[194] That total is
multiplied by 2.4, which represents total employer contributions, and then divided
by an actuarial factor established by the relevant pension system.[195] The higher
the effective rate of interest, the greater the employee’s base annuity amount will
be under the “money purchase” formula when he or she retires.
In addition, an employee participating in SURS cannot receive a base pension
amount greater than 80% of final average salary.[196] If the “money purchase”
formula results in a base pension amount greater than 80% of final average salary,
then the base pension amount is capped at 80% and the employee is entitled to
receive a lump sum refund of any excess contributions made to the pension
system.[197]
Public Act 98-0599 alters the “money purchase” formula by statutorily-pegging the
“effective rate interest” figure at the 30-year U.S. Treasury Bond rates plus .75%,
which would be approximately 4.27%.[198] The effective rate of interest most
recently used for the “money purchase” formula was 7.75%. The consequences of
Public Act 98-0599’s change are two-fold. First, the “money purchase” formula
will produce lower base pensions for SURS members who retire after June 30,
2014. Second, some SURS members upon retiring will not receive a lump sum
refund of their excess contributions because their base pension amount will no
longer exceed the 80% cap.
1% Employee Contribution Rate Reduction. Public Act 98-0599 reduces by
1% of salary the amount current employees must contribute to the pension
system.[199] The contribution rate reduction specifically eliminates the 1% or
0.5% of salary current employees contribute for purposes of funding the previous
3% compounded COLA rate.[200] The contribution rate reduction was included
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by the General Assembly as a form of “consideration” (or value given back) to
employees for the COLA rate reduction and provide a legal defense to that
reduction.[201] Whether the contribution rate reduction qualifies as legal
consideration is a matter Illinois courts will decide in light of the preexisting duty
rule.[202]
Additional Provisions

In addition to making changes to pension benefits, Public Act 98-0599 contains
several other provisions germane to the benefit changes. First, the bill replaces the
1995 funding plan with a new funding plan requiring each pension system to reach
100% funding by fiscal year 2043, as opposed to the 90% funding target in fiscal
year 2045.[203]
Second, the bill includes a provision known as the “funding guarantee” whereby if
the State Comptroller fails to make the State pension contribution required by law
to a relevant State pension system, the relevant pension system board may file suit
before the Illinois Supreme Court to order payment of the required contribution
amount.[204] Unlike the “funding guarantee” provision contained in Senate Bill
2404, the provision in Public Act 98-0599 lacks express language making the State
“contractually obligated” to adhere to the new 100% funding schedule.[205] The
General Assembly, accordingly, appears to retain the discretion to adjust the
required contribution amounts that must be paid to the pension systems each
year.[206]
Third, Public Act 98-0599 redirects 10% of the savings obtained by the legislation
as State contributions back into the pension systems rather than being money
available in the state General Revenue Fund.[207] The bill further redirects $364
million to be contributed into the State pension systems in fiscal year 2019 and $1
billion in fiscal year 2020 and each year thereafter until the pension systems reach
100% funding.[208] The additional contributions made beginning in fiscal year
2019 represent money currently spent by the State to repay general obligation
bonds that will be repaid in fiscal year 2019. As with the “funding guarantee”
provision, the General Assembly appears to retain the discretion to adjust the
additional contribution amounts described above.[209]
Fourth, Public Act 98-0599 creates an option for up to 5% of current employees to
elect to participate in a voluntary, defined contribution plan offered by the affected
State pension systems.[210] The terms of the plan would be established by each
system.[211]
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Fifth, the legislation bars persons hired on or after June 1, 2014 by nongovernmental organizations, such as labor unions, lobbying groups and not-forprofit entities, from participating in the public pension system.[212] The
legislation also prohibits accumulated sick or vacation time from qualifying as
pension service credit or pensionable income for employees hired on or after June
1, 2014.[213]
Finally, Public Act 98-0599 prohibits all pension changes made by the legislation,
subsequent legislation, and the impacts and effects of implementing that
legislation from being a mandatory subject of collective bargaining or interest
arbitration.[214] The only exception to this prohibition is that public employers
and employees may continue to bargain over the pick-up of employee
contributions pursuant to Sections 14-133.1, 15-157.1, or 16-152.1 of the Illinois
Pension Code.[215]
V. THE PENDING LEGAL CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC ACT 98-0599
A.

Procedural History

Not long after Public Act 98-0599 became law on December 5, 2013, five lawsuits
were filed challenging the constitutionality of the legislation.[216] Taken together,
the lawsuits were brought by: current and retired teachers participating in TRS;
two retired State employee groups representing retired SERS, GARS, TRS, and
SURS participants; a coalition of public sector labor unions known as “We Are
One” representing current employees and retirees in SERS, SURS, and TRS; and
the State Universities Annuitants Association (SUAA) representing current
employees and retirees in SURS.[217]
Because the lawsuits were filed in three different judicial circuits,[218] the Illinois
Attorney General moved to consolidate the matters in the circuit court of Cook
County where the first lawsuit was filed.[219] The Attorney General’s motion was
opposed by three groups of plaintiffs who filed suit in the Seventh Judicial Circuit
in Sangamon County and sought consolidation in that circuit. Since the SUAA filed
suit in the Sixth Judicial Circuit in Champaign County, SUAA sought to be separate
from the other suits and proceed in that district.[220] Ultimately, the Illinois
Supreme Court issued an order consolidating all five lawsuits before the circuit
court of Seventh Judicial Circuit in Sangamon County.[221] As of this writing, the
five lawsuits are pending before the Honorable John W. Belz who entered a
preliminary injunction against Public Act 98-0599 on May 15, 2014.[222]
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Plaintiffs’ Legal Challenges To Public Act 98-0599

Overall, the plaintiffs claim that Public Act 98-0599 violates three provisions of the
Illinois Constitution: the Pension Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings
Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs argue that the reduction of the 3% compounded
COLA rate, the COLA skips, the retirement age increase, the pensionable salary
cap, and “money purchase” formula changes all violate these three provisions of
the Illinois Constitution. The Pension Clause claim is the main legal argument
against Public Act 98-0599 with the Contract and Takings Clause claims pled as
alternative legal theories as to why the legislation’s benefit changes improperly
interfere with plaintiffs’ contract or property rights. Through different individual
plaintiffs, the lawsuits contend that the five pension benefits reductions made by
Public Act 98-0599 “diminish or impair” their benefits in violations of the Pension
Clause. Interestingly, the “We Are One” and SUAA plaintiffs also assert a Taking
Clause claim that the State’s failure to properly fund the State’s pension systems
has resulted in a taking of private property.[223] The plaintiffs did not assert any
federal law claims against Public Act 98-0599.
In addition, the two State employee groups assert that the legislation violates the
Illinois Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause by not applying the benefit
reductions to current and retired judges.[224] These plaintiffs further claim that
Public Act 98-0599’s COLA rate reduction violates the Contract Clause because the
State purportedly made a contractual commitment through its 2002 early
retirement incentive program whereby employees purchased service credit and the
continued entitlement to the 3% compounded COLA rate in exchange for the State
receiving lower personnel costs.[225] The Retired State Employees Association
additionally claims that Senate Bill 1’s COLA rate reduction violates the Contract
Clause because the State contractually bound itself to continue to offer a 3% COLA
rate to SERS participants through statements made in SERS’ member handbooks
between 1982 and 2011.[226]
With respect to the 3% compounded COLA rate, the plaintiffs contend that Public
Act 98-0599’s rate reduction will result in significantly smaller COLA increases in
the future for the persons whose base pension amounts are subject to the new
COLA rate.[227] The higher the base pension amount for these persons, plaintiffs
assert, the greater their loss in future COLA increases when compared to the prior
COLA rate. The “We Are One” plaintiffs, for example, state in their complaint that
the COLA rate reduction will reduce the future COLA payments to one retiree by
almost $71,000 by the time he reaches age 85.[228]
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This loss in future COLA increases, according to the “We Are One” plaintiffs, has a
compounded impact on current employees who are also subject to Public Act 980599’s COLA skips provision, retirement age increase, and pensionable salary
cap.[229] As another example, Public Act 98-0599 would purportedly reduce the
pension benefits of one current employee by approximately $718,000 over the
course of a 25 year retirement.[230] Public Act 98-0599’s 1% reduction in that
employee’s contribution rate, however, would only result in that employee
recouping $15, 613.[231]
The SUAA complaint and its motion for a injunctive relief set forth the impact of
Public Act 98-0599’s change to the “money purchase” formula.[232] SUAA states
that by statutorily pegging the “effective rate interest” figure at 30-year U.S.
Treasury Bond rates plus .75%, Public Act 98-0599 will have two adverse
consequences for current employees in SURS.[233] First, the “money purchase”
formula will produce a lower base pension amount than before the “effective rate
of interest” change.[234] Second, for some employees in SURS, this change will
result in a base pension amount less than 80% of final average salary, whereas
before it would have exceeded that amount.[235] Accordingly, these employees
will no longer receive at retirement a lump sum refund of any excess contributions
they made to the pension system so their base pension amount would not exceed
the 80% cap.[236]
C.

The Illinois Attorney General’s Defense of Public Act 98-0599

As of September 2014, the Illinois Attorney General has asserted essentially two
defenses to uphold the constitutionality of Public Act 98-0599. First, with respect
to the COLA rate reduction and COLA skips provisions, the Illinois Attorney
General contends that the 3% compounded COLA rate itself is “not part of the core
pension benefit” protected by the Pension Clause.[237]
The Illinois Attorney General states that the 3% compounded COLA rate was
enacted in 1989 and awarded to retirees and dependents already receiving
pensions and they had not made any contributions to the pension systems in
exchange for the increase.[238] Also, the 3% compounded COLA rate was awarded
to existing employees who merely continued to work after the increase was enacted
without a corresponding increase in employee contributions.[239] The Illinois
Attorney General further notes that the COLA rate has been increased by the
legislature on several occasions, and the last time a COLA increase was coupled
with an increase in employee contributions was in 1969 whereby employees
contributed 0.5% of salary for a 1.5% simple annual increase on their base pension
amount.[240] The Illinois Attorney General also points out that the 3%
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compounded COLA rate has “in recent years substantially exceeded
inflation.”[241] Public Act 98-0599’s COLA rate change, the Illinois Attorney
General asserts, “was designed to have the least impact on members with the
lowest salaries on which their pensions are calculated, on members who put in the
most years of public service, and on members who retired before July 1,
2014.”[242]
Thus, the Illinois Attorney General appears to contend that the 3% compounded
COLA (or any COLA increase) is not a protected “benefit” for Pension Clause
purposes.[243] Similarly, the Illinois Attorney General appears to argue that even
if it were a protected “benefit” under the Clause, persons already receiving
pensions prior to when the 3% compound COLA increase become law in 1989 have
no reasonable expectation to its continuation because they no longer worked for
the State.[244] The same, under the Illinois Attorney General’s logic, would apply
to persons who were current employees prior to 1989 who continued working for
the State because they did not make increased contributions to the pension
systems in exchange for the increase.[245]
The Illinois Attorney General’s second defense of Public Act 98-0599 rests on the
State’s so-called “police” or reserved powers. In its answer and defenses to the
complaints, the Illinois Attorney General asserts that Public Act 98-0599 is a
“permissible exercise of the State of Illinois’ reserved sovereign powers (sometimes
referred to as the State’s police powers).”[246] In support, the Illinois Attorney
General contends that the underfunding in the State-funded retirement system
contributed significantly to a severe financial crisis adversely affecting the longterm financial soundness of those systems, the cost of financing the State’s
operation and outstanding debt, and the State’s ability to provide critical services
to Illinois residents.[247] The Illinois Attorney General further contends that the
causes of this underfunding stemmed from “significant unforeseen and
unanticipated events,” such as poor stock market returns by the pension systems,
historically low inflation, significant increases in life expectancy, and other
changes in actuarial assumptions.[248]
These increased unfunded liabilities, the Illinois Attorney General argues, led to
substantial reductions in the State’s revenues to contribute to the pension systems
and to spend on salaries and other benefits for State employees.[249] The Illinois
Attorney General further asserts that these unfunded liabilities have become
unsustainable, have grown worse, and have created substantial uncertainty to the
State’s business climate and ability to produce tax revenues to support public
services and fund the pension systems.[250]
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The Illinois Attorney General claims the General Assembly enacted Public Act 980599 as a reasonable and necessary response to unanticipated exigencies to
address the State’s financial crisis after already taking earlier action to reduce
public spending, raise income taxes, defer State vendor payments, and enact a
second tier of pension benefits for new hires in 2010.[251] For these reasons, the
Illinois Attorney General argues that Public Act 98-0599 “represents a valid
exercise of the State’s reserved sovereign powers to modify contractual rights and
obligations, including contractual obligations of the State established under Article
I, Section 16 and Article XII [sic], Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution.”[252]
In late June 2014, the plaintiffs collectively responded to the Attorney General by
moving for summary judgment to invalidate Public Act 98-0599 solely on their
Pension Clause claims.[253] In that motion, the plaintiffs contend that the Pension
Clause is not subject to a police power exception based on its plain language and
drafting history as well as relevant Illinois court decisions.[254] At this point,
however, the trial court judge has decided to postpone action on the plaintiffs’
motion and will allow the Attorney General to develop its defense by permitting
fact and expert witnesses to be called. To that end, the court established a
discovery schedule extending into December 2014.[255] The trial court judge, at
that point, appeared inclined to have the parties prepare a detailed factual record
before ruling on each of the plaintiffs’ claims and the Attorney General’s
defenses. As this Article went to press, however, the trial court judge entered an
order staying discovery and expressed interest in deciding the case by the end of
this calendar year.[256]
VI. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
As of September 2014, the Illinois Attorney General has not set forth the specific
legal authority supporting her claim that the State’s so-called police or reserved
powers allowed the General Assembly to make the unilateral pension benefit cuts
provided in Public Act 98-0599 without violating the Pension Clause. Illinois’
business community, however, through the Commercial Club of Chicago and its
law firm, Sidley Austin, previously articulated such an argument in April 2011 in
response to an earlier article that this author wrote that comprehensively reviewed
the origins, background, and scope of the Pension Clause.[257]
Sidley argued that because paying 100% of all pension benefits will “crowd out
expenditures on health, education, and public safety” under current revenue
assumptions, the State can trump is obligations under the Pension Clause and
divert funds to fund government services the General Assembly deems
essential.[258] Sidley rested this conclusion on the claim that “no constitutional
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rights are absolute,” its reading of the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in Felt v.
Board of Trustees of the Judges Retirement Systems, and its view that the Pension
Clause provides no better protection than the Contract Clause of the U.S.
Constitution.[259] While Sidley’s police powers argument is fatally flawed for
several reasons articulated by this author elsewhere, only one need be discussed
here.[260]
The police powers argument cannot be squared with the Pension Clause’s plain
language which admits of no exceptions. Nor is that argument supported by the
Pension Clause’s drafting history, Convention debates, and voters’ understanding
of the Clause.[261] Indeed, the drafters did not accept the proposal made by
Delegate Wayne Whalen, an opponent of the Pension Clause, to expressly amend
the Illinois Constitution’s Contract Clause to protect public pensions or his view
that the Pension Clause provided no better protection than the Contract
Clause.[262]
Instead, the delegates adopted an independent provision modeled after the one
found in the New York Constitution to ensure “the vested rights of pension plan
participants not be defeated or diminished.”[263] The Illinois Supreme Court has
explained that the framers added the Clause to give public employees “a basic
protection against abolishing their rights completely or changing the terms of their
rights after they have embarked upon the employment—to lessen them.”[264] The
Clause, as the Court recently observed, was intended “to guarantee that retirement
rights enjoyed by public employees would be afforded contractual status and
insulated from diminishment and impairment by the General Assembly.”[265] In
addition, the notion that the Pension Clause is subject to a police powers exception
has already been rejected by Illinois courts on two occasions.[266]
Moreover, if the drafters intended to subject the Pension Clause to a police powers
exception, then they certainly knew how to accomplish that result as they did with
the individual constitutional right to bear arms found in Article I, Section 22 of the
Illinois Constitution.[267] As the Illinois Supreme Court recently concluded, “[w]e
may not rewrite the pension protection clause to include restrictions and
limitations that the drafters did not express and the citizens of the Illinois did not
approve.”[268] Accordingly, the State’s police power is not superior to the Pension
Clause; rather it yields to the Clause, just as it yields to other specific constitutional
prohibitions and positive mandates.[269]
Also, the Pension Clause cannot be equated with the Bill of Rights to the U.S.
Constitution as inherently containing or being subject to exceptions based on
notions of necessity. As the U.S. Supreme Court explained long ago, it is “well-
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settled” that the Bill of Rights was “not intended to lay down any novel principles
of government, but simply certain guaranties and immunities which were inherited
from our English ancestors, and which had, from time immemorial, been subject
to certain well-recognized exceptions, arising from the necessities of the
case.”[270]
The Pension Clause, in contrast, does not have such a history or intent to
accommodate exceptions based on claims of necessity. As noted above, Delegate
Green stated during the Convention that one of the purposes of the Clause was to
bar the State from relying on the consequences of its failure to properly fund the
pension system as a basis for cutting or repudiating it pension obligations as was
the case in New Jersey in 1964.[271]
Simply put, the Pension Clause constitutes what the U.S. Supreme Court described
in its Blaisdell decision as a constitutional restriction that is specific and “so
particularized as to not admit of construction” based on its language and
history.[272] In Blaisdell, the Supreme Court implied a police power exception to
the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution based on that clause’s “general
language,” unhelpful legislative history, and the fact that the Tenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution reserves police power to the States.[273] None of these
features, which were dispositive in Blaisdell about the Contract Clause, apply to
the Pension Clause.
After all, what constitutes a “contract” or “impairment” for Contract Clause
purposes is strictly a question of federal, not state law.[274] As the Illinois
Supreme Court has explained, “[t]his court’s jurisprudence of state constitutional
law cannot be predicated on trends in legal scholarship, the actions of our sister
states, a desire to bring about change in the law, or a sense of deference to the
nation’s highest court.”[275] “Rather, our choice of a rule of decision on matters
governed by both the state and federal constitutions has always been and must
continue to be predicated on our best assessment of the intent of the drafters, the
delegates, and the voters—this is out solemn obligation.”[276] As a result, the
likelihood of a police power defense succeeding to vindicate Public Act 98-0599
should be at best an extremely remote outcome, especially because of the Clause’s
plain language, drafting history, and purpose, and because of Illinois’ longstanding and conscious failure to properly fund the pension systems as discussed
above.
With that said, the Illinois Attorney General’s position that the 3% compounded
COLA rate is not a protected “benefit” under the Pension Clause for persons who
were already retired and receiving pensions prior to that rate increase becoming
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law in August 1989 has merit. The Illinois Appellate Court has long held that a
member of pension system who did not continue working or make contributions
to the pension system after the legislature enacted a benefit increase is not entitled
to that benefit increase under the Clause.[277] These decisions explain that
allowing a member to receive the benefit increase would be tantamount to “an
unconstitutional expenditure of public funds for a private purpose” in violation of
Article VIII, Section 1 of the Illinois Constitution.[278] Whether the Illinois
Supreme Court will reach the same conclusion remains to be seen.
Finally, the claim that the 3% compounded COLA is not a protected “benefit” under
the Pension Clause cannot withstand scrutiny for employees who joined the
pension system or continued working for the State after the Pension Code
provision took effect in 1989. During the Convention debates, the sponsors of the
Pension Clause refuted the opponents’ claim that the Clause required inflationary
protection of benefits.[279] Those statements, however, do not support the
conclusion that a Pension Code provision that automatically increases a member’s
base pension amount during retirement lacks Pension Clause protection. As
Delegate Henry Green stated in response to the opponents, “any of you know when
you buy an insurance policy you’re going to get what the contract says. Now if the
dollar isn’t worth but 27 cents when you get it back, there is absolutely no reason
why you have any recourse against the insurance company.”[280] Delegate Kinney
also explained that “an increase in benefits would not be precluded” by the Clause
and that the legislature could tie pension benefits to automatic cost of living
increases.[281]
Indeed, as the Illinois Supreme Court recently determined, the Pension Clause’s
plain language protects all benefits that are “limited to, conditioned on, and flow
directly from membership in one of the State’s various public pension systems”
whether found in the Pension Code or in other state statutes.[282] The Clause
further protects benefit increases later enacted so long as the person continues
working or contributing to the pension system after the increase takes
effect.[283] As a result, it is hard to fathom how the 3% compounded COLA rate
increase provision found in the Pension Code would not qualify as a protected
benefit for those plaintiffs who either joined the pension system or continued
working for the State after that Pension Code provision took effect in 1989.
In closing, Public Act 98-0599 is not the first instance where the State has
attempted to trump the plain language and purpose of a specific provision of the
Illinois Constitution under the banner of fiscal necessity. In 1863, the Illinois
Supreme Court, in the midst of the Civil War, considered the constitutionality of
legislation passed in 1861 that swept and diverted moneys from a special property
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tax and fund established by Article XV of the 1848 Illinois
Constitution.[284] Article XV was separately approved by Illinois voters[285] for
the purpose of retiring the “almost insurmountable”[286] debts the State had
incurred during the 1830s and 1840s to finance internal improvement projects,
such as the construction of railroads and improved modes of river
transportation.[287]
The preamble of the 1861 legislation declared that while the State’s financial
condition required more revenue, the State’s “prosperity” “imperatively
demand[ed]” that such revenue not come from taxation, “but on the contrary, if
possible, by diminishing [the State’s] present heavy rate of taxation.”[288] To that
end, the legislation ordered the State Auditor to sweep the moneys in Article XV’s
special fund and also divert the proceeds of the special property tax for deposit into
the general revenue fund for expenditure on other purposes.[289] In defending the
legislation, the State Auditor claimed without dispute that if the diverted moneys
had to be restored to Article XV’s special fund to repay bondholders, then the State
Treasury would be “bankrupt” and the State would not be able to pay its ordinary
expenses.[290]
The Illinois Supreme Court invalidated the 1861 legislation as violative of Article
XV’s plain language and purpose, and ordered the restoration of the diverted
funds.[291] The Court bluntly explained that “however praiseworthy” was the
legislature’s desire “to relieve the people from a heavy, and apparently, an
unnecessary tax” the “injunction of the constitution should be considered above
them all.”[292] The Court continued that “[p]rivate distress, great financial
embarrassments, even public calamity, are held, by a just people, as airy nothings,
when weighed against the high behests of the constitution.”[293] Emphatically,
the Court stated:
Let it not be said, however great disasters may befall us, however much we may be
impoverished, how heavy the burden imposed upon us may be, we will, for relief, destroy the
constitution, or disregard its requirements. Our safety, in the midst of perils, is in a strict
observance of the constitution—this is the bulwark to shield us from aggressions. Trifling with
it, treating it lightly, dispensing with this or that provision of it, is the sure precursor of the
direst calamity which can befall the people, the end of which cannot fail to be, anarchy and
ruin.”[294]

Moreover, in response to the State Auditor’s claim that the State Treasury lacked
adequate funds to pay ordinary State government expenses without the diverted
moneys, the Court stated that the General Assembly was “composed of high
minded, and patriotic, and just men, clothed with ample powers to provide for all
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financial difficulties” and that they would “promptly” come up with a way to rescue
the State.”[295]
In sum, if this State’s law and history is at all dispositive, then Public Act 98-0599
will most likely suffer a fate similar to the 1861 law. For this outcome to have
lasting significance, however, will require the public’s acceptance of the obligations
and boundaries imposed by the Pension Clause, and the public’s rejection of the
mindset that “history is more or less bunk…and the only history that is worth a
tinker’s damn is the history we make today.”[296]
____________________________________________________________________________________
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EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, at 11, 18, 23-24, 31, 44-49
(same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1963, at 13-14, 25-32, (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1965, at 14, 37-46 (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1967, at 9, 12, 45-52; id at 9
(noting that the recommendation “received acceptance at the State
level.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1969, at 11, 14-15, 57-65 (same).
[32] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1957,
at 76; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1965, at 39 (same).
[33] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1965,
at 10; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1971, at 10 (1971) (same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION
LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 15 (1977) (same); see also REPORT OF THE
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-80, at 13 (stating
that the “method of current budgeting of the accruing pension cost as has been
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advocated by the Commission by integrating such costs with the personnel budget
has not as yet received full acceptance among the various public agencies.”).
[34] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION of 1965,
at 41.
[35] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1957,
at 8; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1965, at 10 (“What is of primary concern to the Commission and imperatively
required is a financial policy on the part of both the State of Illinois and the local
governments which will produce adequate revenues for the financial needs of these
funds on a basis that will permit financial progress and the development of the
pension funds consistent with recognized principles for financing pensions.”).
[36] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1965,
at 46; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1979-80, at 52 (same).
[37] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION Of 1965,
at 46.
[37] See REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1947, at 48, 57-59 (briefly discussing how pensions are treated under Illinois
law and case law developments); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1951, at 82-91 (analyzing the legal status of pension
rights under Illinois law); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION OF 1953, at 94-104 (detailing the legal protections afforded to pension
benefits deemed protected under a contractual theory); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1961, at 71 (explaining the nature
of gratuity plans); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION OF 1965, at 103-07 (discussing whether pension benefits were
protected as vested or contractual rights, noting that “number of courts adopting
the view that such pensions are in the nature of contractual or vested rights,” and
referring to this trend as “disturbing” because of the limits this theory could place
on the ability legislature to alter or amend benefit rights).
[39] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION Of 1961,
at 71.
[40] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1969,
at 32.
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[41] Id.
[42] COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, FINANCIAL
CONDITION OF THE ILLINOIS STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM as of June 30, 2013, at 27
(Mar. 2014) available at:http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/FinCondILStateRetireme
ntSysFY13Mar2014.pdf.
[43] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1969,
at 42.
[44] Id. at 32.
[45] See Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 7-40 (for a detailed discussion of
the background, purposes, and scope of the Pension Clause); ROBERT TILOVE,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE PENSION FUNDS 337 (1976) (reviewing public pensions generally,
focusing on New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois specifically and finding with
respect to the Illinois Constitution’s Pension Clause: “This provision, written by a
constitutional convention, was copied almost verbatim from New York’s
constitution of 1938. Supported by organized labor and other employee groups
and by some system trustees and administrators, the clause was opposed by the
Pension Laws Commission, which argued that it was too rigid, would inhibit
change, and would preclude correction of errors or equitable adjustments in rates
of contribution, eligibility conditions, and the like. There was a major argument in
favor of the clause: the failure of the state and its municipalities to fund the systems
adequately. The danger of benefit cuts because of fiscal pressure seemed like a real
possibility at the time.”); Bob Sector & Rick Pearson, Pension Crisis Rooted in 1970
Debate, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 23, 2013, available at: http://articles.chicagotribune.
com/2013-09-22/news/ct-met-public-pensions-1970-20130923_1_pension-clau
se-pension-debate-constitutional-convention (reviewing the 1970 Constitutional
Convention debates of the Pension Clause and concluding that both its backers and
critics agreed the provision “was aimed at providing an ironclad guarantee to
public workers that their pension benefits, once promised could not be trimmed”
and the Clause was prompted by “a chronic failure by lawmakers to pay enough
money into the funds to cover projected pension costs and keep them financially
sound.”). Cf. Elk Grove Engineering Co. v. Korzen, 55 Ill.2d 393, 399-400, 304
N.E.2d 65, 69 (1973) (“The framers of the constitution would naturally examine
the state of things at the time; and their work sufficiently attests that they did so.”).
[46] Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811 at ¶45 quoting IV Proceedings, Sixth Ill.
Constitutional Convention 2930-31 (1970) (statements of Delegate Bottino)
[hereinafter IV Proceedings].
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[47] IV Proceedings, supra note 46, at 2931(1970) (remarks of Delegate Green).
[48] Id. (referring to Spina v. Consolidated Police and Firemen’s Fund Comm’n,
41 N.J. 391, 396, 402-04, 197 A.2d 169, 171, 176-76 (N.J. 1964)).
[49] Id. at 2931; see also id. at 2930 (remarks of Delegate Bottino) (“[P]articipants
in these pension systems have been leery for years of the fact that—this matter of
the amount the state has appropriated has been made a political football, in a
sense. In other words, in order to balance budgets, you see, the party in power
would just use the amount of the state contribution to help balance budgets, and
this had gotten to the point where many of the so-called pensioners under this
system were very concerned; and I think this is the reason that pressure is
constantly being placed on the legislature to at least put in a fair amount of state
resources into guaranteeing payment of pensions.”).
[50] Id. at 2931. See Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, at ¶46 (quoting Delegate
Green’s Convention statements as establishing that the Clause was intended “to
protect ‘public employees who are beginning to lost faith in the ability of the state
and its political subdivisions to meet these benefit payments’ and to address the
‘insecurity on the part of the public employees [which] is really defeating the very
purpose for which the retirement system was established.”) (quoting IV
Proceedings 2925). Id. at ¶46 (quoting remarks of Delegate Kemp, a supporter of
the Clause, who “viewed its purpose as ‘mak[ing] certain that irrespective of the
financial condition of a municipality or even the state government, that those
persons who have worked for often substandard wages over a long period of time
could at least expect to live in some kind of dignity during their golden years.”)
(quoting IV Proceedings 2926).
[51] Legislative Commission Reorganization Act of 1984, Public Act 83-1257 (Ill.
1984).
[52] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1971,
at 9; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1973, at 69 (1973) (noting that increased unfunded liabilities “cannot be
attributed to low rates of employee contributions.”); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 67 (stating that the failure
to meet statutory funding policies for the state pension systems “is largely, though
not exclusively, responsible for the increasing level of unfunded liabilities. A
contributory retirement plan depends upon three critical sources of
revenue. These are (1) employee contributions, (2) employer contributions, and
(3) income derived from the investment of the employer and employee
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contributions. The employees have met their obligations since the inception of the
system. The State has failed substantially to meet its share of the cost.”); REPORT
OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-1980, at 48
(same); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1981-1983, at 10, 39 (1983) (same).
[53] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION of 1971,
at 9.
[54] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 19791980, at 66.
[55] Id.
[56] Id. at 66-67.
[57] Id.
[58] Id. at 67.
[59] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1971,
at 29-36; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1973, at 17-18, 20-24, 27-30, 65-73; ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION, MAJOR POLICY JUDGMENTS, at 1 (Mar. 9, 1976) (“Pension costs should
be budgeted currently as a part of the personnel service expense of each
department or agency of government, thus expressing this cost equitably on a
functional basis. The normal cost rate should be expressed as as a percentage of
payroll to be applied annually by each department or agency against the amount
requested for personal services. An addition to the rate should be provided to
cover the interest accrual on the unfunded pension liability, thus stabilizing such
liability at its current level. This procedure would meet satisfactorily technical
requirements for funding pension liabilities for public pension funds.”); REPORT OF
THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 10, 14,
17-18, 23-25, 49-51, 56-60, 61-68; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1979-80, at 9, 37-38, 46-52, 85-87; REPORT OF THE
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1981-83, at 29-44 (1983)
(same).
[60] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 198183, at 31-33 (1983).
[61] Id. at 33.
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[62] Id.
[63] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1973,
at 8.
[64] Id.
[65] Id. at 23-24.
[66] Id.; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION OF 1971, at 65-69 (discussing the Commission’s failed attempts to
modify the Pension Clause during the Constitutional Convention, the implications
of the Clause, and limits the Clause would have on the ability of the General
Assembly to unilaterally change pension benefits); REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 77-82) (1977) (discussing
the scope of the Pension Clause in light of court decisions from New York).
[67] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1973,
at 13 (“As a means of alleviating the fiscal problems of government, a proposal has
recently been advanced by economists and educators to fund the public employee
retirement systems on a strict payout basis and thus dispense with the need for
accumulated reserves. This method has been advanced as a means of ‘reducing’
public expenditures. An ‘owe-as-you-go-’ or strict ‘payout’ funding basis is
unacceptable since it results in a deferment of the burden of financing currently
incurred benefit obligations to future generations of taxpayers. The Commission’s
unequivocal conclusion is that instead of reducing cost requirements for pensions,
it will result in appreciably greater costs to government.”); id. at 65-73 (further
discussion of the current funding policy and proper alternatives); REPORT OF THE
ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1975-1977, at 49-51, 6168; ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW: February
1988, at 2 (1988) (identifying FY 1973 as the first year of the “payout” funding
policy).
[68] TAXPAYERS’ FEDERATION OF ILLINOIS, ILLINOIS STATE SPENDING: THE THOMSON
YEARS, 1978-88, at 90 (1988) [hereinafter Taxpayers’ Report].
[69] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 1973,
at X; REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION
OF 1979-80, at 38 (“In the case of State-financed pension plans, arbitrary
appropriations unrelated to actual requirements result only in a deferment of the
pension obligations. Considerably larger allocations to the pension plans will be
required in the future.”).

SUMMER 2014

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT

45

[70] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 19751977, at 62-64; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION OF 1979-80, at 46-52 (examining the payout method and expected
sharp increase in benefit payments in future years as well as the need to adopt an
actuarially-sound funding policy).
[71] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 19751977, at 64.
[72] Id.; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION OF 1981-1983, at 30 (“Proponents of ‘pay-as-you-go’ funding argue
that in the case of public retirement systems, the unlimited taxing power of
government provides sufficient guarantee that benefits will be paid. But there is a
distinct possibility that if future pension requirements become too burdensome,
and adequate pension assets do not exist, pension benefits will be reduced by
legislative action or a new, less liberal retirement plan will be instituted for new
employees.”).
[73] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 19751977, at 64-65; see also REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS
COMMISSION OF 1979-1980, at 13, 43 (same).
[74] REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEES PENSION LAWS COMMISSION OF 19751977, at 65.
[75] NOEL EBRAHIM ET AL., OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, A REPORT
PENSION SYSTEMS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS (1979).

ON THE

PUBLIC

[76] Id. at 1 (Mercer Recommendations) (“Unfunded liabilities are projected to
grow at an alarming rate. It is urgent for the state of Illinois to establish a funding
program which will, at a minimum, stabilize the unfunded liabilities of the various
state and local systems. The three major state benefit retirement systems, though
solvent and making payments today, will not be able to meet future commitments
because of the growth of the unfunded portion of the plans. It is doubtful that taxes
will be able to keep pace with benefits and payout schedules. Because these funds
face enormous future unfunded liabilities, it is quite possible that the bond rating
of the state will be negatively affected. The Pension Laws Commission has held
consistently to the recommendation of paying current costs plus interest on
unfunded liability. Its effect has been to stabilize the present unfunded amounts
to preclude growth of this liability. We agree and support this
recommendation. Because a major commitment to establishing the unfunded
liabilities of the systems would create a serious budgetary crisis if implemented
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immediately, we recommend that the rational approach toward funding this
liability is the ‘grade in’ program. This approach envisions slowly grading in year
by year, to the stabilized level of funding consistent with the guidelines of the
Pension Laws Commission.”).
[77] Id. at 3.
[78] Id. at 8-11; id. at 1 (Mercer Recommendations).
[79] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC
1988, at 2 (Feb. 1988).

AND

FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW: February

[80] JUDY BAAR TOPINKA, FISCAL FOCUS, ILLINOIS STATE PENSION SYSTEMS: A
CHALLENGING POSITION 3 (May 2011) [hereinafter TOPINKA REPORT] available
at: http://www.ioc.state.il.us/index.cfm/resources/fiscal-focus/may-2011-illin
ois-state-pension-systems-a-challenging-position/; TAXPAYERS
REPORT, supra note 68, at 90.
[81] See ILLINOIS STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENT POLICIES,
FINAL REPORT 8 (Mar. 1982) (stating “net investment income recorded the sharpest
advance in the FY76-FY81 period, increasing more than 2 ½ times from $141.4
million to approximately $397.6 million. As a consequence, investment income
accounts for a larger proportion of the [three funding sources] than it did five years
ago: 35% rather than 24%.”).
[82] GOVERNOR’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM TASK FORCE REPORT, December 1985, at 28
(1985).
[83] See TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 91; ILLINOIS STUDY COMMISSION ON
PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENT POLICIES, FINAL REPORT 8 (Mar. 1982) (noting the
state’s adherence to the 100% payout policy, but the departure from that policy in
FY 1982 as a “budget savings measure”); State of Illinois, File No. 3-15237, Release
No. 9389 at 3 (S.E.C. Mar. 13, 2013), available at: http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
admin/2013/33-9389.pdf [hereinafter “SEC Order”]; Jennifer Halperin, Pension
Deficit Haunts Future: State Government Is Biggest Employer In Illinois, But
The State Is Years Behind in Funding Its Pension System,, ILLINOIS ISSUES, July
1993, at 18, available at: http://www.lib.niu.edu/1993/ii930717.html (“One habit
consistently pointed out as devastating to the pension funds began in 1982, when
the state stopped contributing enough money to the funds to cover checks going
out in the same year. The stock market was doing well, so pension funds’
investment income was up. In response, former Governor James R. Thompson
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reduced state contributions to less than two-thirds of the 1982 payout to
retirees. That practice was supposed to be limited to one year but was not.”).
[84] TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 91; TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at
4.
[85] TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 91-94; TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80
at 4; Dawn Clark Netsch, Testimony Before the Joint Hearing of the Select
Committee on Aging and the Joint Economic Committee’s Subcommittee on
Investment: Using Public Employee Pensions to Balance State and Local Budgets:
The Impact on Public Employees, Retirees, and Taxpayers 22 (Nov. 20, 1991) (“The
basic problem is that the systems are not and have not been funded on an actuarial
basis. From FY 1973 through FY 1981, the State contribution was set equal to 100%
of benefit payout, on the assumption that both employee contributions and
investment would be invested to provide for future benefits. When Illinois went
into the recession in the early 1980s, one of the casualties was the State’s pension
contributions. In FY 1982, the aggregate contribution to the five systems was
reduced to the equivalent of 62.5% of payout, one month’s school, aid payments
were delayed, over $60 million was ‘borrowed’ from other State funds, and $150
million was borrowed in the credit markets. For FY 1983, the Governor proposed
a five-year phased-in return to 100% of payout and proposed a contribution equal
to 70% of payout, but only 51% of payout was enacted. For FY 1984, the Governor
proposed 77.5% of payout, but only 60% of payout was enacted and that became
Illinois ‘funding policy’ through FY 1987. For FY 1988, the Governor proposed a
$1 billion tax increase, but no increase in pension contributions over the prior
year. When the legislature refused to pass the tax increase, he cut agency budgets
across the board and took additional cuts out of the pension contribution, for a
total reduction of over $60 million. The cuts were justified by claiming that the
State “should share in the retirement systems’ above average investment
returns.” Two months later the stock market fell by over 500 points and the
systems ended the year with investment returns of 2.5% or less. The resulting
appropriation was the equivalent of 44% of payout, and a ‘new’ funding policy was
implemented—at least for one more year.”)
[86] TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 4.
[87] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW 20-22 & Tbl. 8
(1990) (“For the State systems, there is no relationship between contributions
required under normal cost plus interest and actual employer contributions. [T]he
employer contribution has fallen far short of the employer’s normal cost plus
interest between FY 1984 and FY 1989. Over that period State contributions have
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been related to benefit payout rather than the actuarial cost of benefits earned. The
percentage of the required contribution that has been covered by the State has
varied considerably. The contribution for TRS began at 50% in FY 1984, rose to
over 60%, and then dropped below 50% for FY 1989. The percentage for SERS
also improved and then dropped, while the SURS percentage increased slightly
over the period and then decline. The covered percentages for JRS and GARS also
fluctuated. The system considered to be the healthiest of the State systems (SERS0
had about two-thirds of the contribution covered for FY 1989. The largest system,
TRS, had less than half of the contribution covered in FY 1989, and about onethird was covered for SURS. Even thought the TRS and SURS are currently in
similar financial condition and have been receiving State contributions based on
similar percentages of payout, the implications of continuing recent employer
funding practices are more serious for SURS due to the size of the system and the
particularly significant shortfalls between actual employer contributions and those
required under normal cost plus interest.”).
[88] TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 4.
[89] Bob Sector, Pension Mess Now All The Rage In Springfield, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
30, 2012, available at: 2012 WLNR 28162974.
[90] Id.
[91] Public Act 82-960 (Ill. 1982); TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at
93; ILLINOIS TAX FOUNDATION, TWO DECADES OF ILLINOIS STATE SPENDING: 19721992, at 81 (1992) (“In FY72, employee contributions were the systems’ main
income source, providing more than one-half of the state retirement systems’ total
income. State appropriations provided roughly one-third of the total at that time
and investment income represented only 14 percent of the total income for these
systems. By FY75, state appropriations had become the primary income source
and remained so for six consecutive years (through FY81). . . . Investment income
became the retirement systems’ principal income source beginning in the recession
year of FY82 and it remained so through FY91. Through most of the ‘80s, state
appropriations declined as a percentage of system’s income, and from FY88-FY91
state retirement appropriations for the first time provided less cash for the
retirement systems than was provided by employee payroll contributions.”)
(emphasis added).
[92] See ILLINOIS STUDY COMMISSION ON PUBLIC PENSION INVESTMENT POLICIES,
FINAL REPORT, at 8, 44-47 (1982) (explaining that the investment authority of each
state pension fund is subject to specific statutory restrictions); id. at 10 (stating
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that the investment returns of the five state pension funds “have not kept pace with
inflation. The funds have also lagged behind other indicators of institutional
investments. Over the last five years, the Standard & Poor 500 Index has had an
annualized rate of return of 10.1%. The entire universe of public and private
retirement funds had an average return of 8.6% for the same time period. Public
funds, however, averaged significantly lower returns: 5.6% annually for the past
five years and 3.1% in FY 1981.”); id. at 5 (stating that “improvements in the
performance of the funds can relieve some of the pressures on the state and its
employees to increase contributions.”); id. at 23 (“The Commission believes that
inferior performance by the funds in recent years was due in part to compliance
with statutory provisions.”).
[93] Id. at 15; id. at 24 (same). The study also explained that: “[t]he prudent
person rule is reinforced by several legal administrative and structural checks and
balances, including Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution, which
guarantees the payment of pension benefits.”). Id. at 2 of Executive
Summary. The study further explained that the Pension Clause “guarantees that
retirement benefits, as enforceable contractual obligations, are paid as
promised.” Id. at 26.
[94] Id. at 19.
[95] Id. at 8, 28-30. The study stated that with respect to investment in mortgage
backed securities, the pension funds “should require the original lender remain at
risk for some portion of the package to ensure that appropriate underwriting
standards are used in approving the underlying loans.” Id. at 30.
[96] TAXPAYERS REPORT, supra note 68, at 90, 93-94. Because “[e]conomic
downturns and other market shifts do not constitute unanticipated circumstances
in a market-based economy,” Ferguson v. Ferguson, 54 So.3d 553, 556 (Fla. App.
2011), the State, as a contracting party, appears to have assumed the foreseeable
risk of future stock market downturns by shifting its investment policy to one
seeking higher stock market returns. See YPI 180 N. LaSalle Owners, LLC v. 180
N. LaSalle II, Inc., 403 Ill.App.3d 1, 7, 933 N.E. 2d 860, 865 (1st Dist. 2010)
(stating that “if the risk was foreseeable there should have been a provision for it
in the contract, and the absence of such a provision gives rise to the inference that
the risk was assumed.”) (quoting U.S. v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 905 (1996)).
[97] GOVERNOR’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM TASK FORCE REPORT, December 1985, at 5, 7,
13(1985).
[98] Id. at 8, 71-83, 178.
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[99] Id. at 32, 42-49.
[100] Id. at 48.
[101] See Charles N. Wheeler, Policy Procrastination: State Pension
Systems, ILLINOIS ISSUES, February 1988, at 3, available at:http://www.lib.niu
.edu/1988/ii880204.html (citing ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION,
PENSION OVERVIEW: February 1988, at iv (1988)).
[102] Id. at 4; ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, PENSION OVERVIEW: February 1988, at 25-27 (1988).
[103] Public Act 86-273 (Ill. 1989).
[104] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 1995, PENSION
FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 4 (1994) (also explaining that under Public Act 86-273,
“[t]he State contribution, as a percentage of the applicable employee payroll, was
schedule to be increased in equal, annual increments over the seven year period,
until the specified funding requirements are met.”); Michael D. Klemens, State
Pensions: The Truth and The Consequences, ILLINOIS ISSUES, Nov. 1991, at
18, available at:http://www.lib.niu.edu/1991/ii911118.html.
[105] Dawn Clark Netsch, State Pension Raids Rampant In the 1990s, ILLINOIS
MUNICIPAL REV., Feb. 1993, at 15 (Feb. 1993); see also LLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL
COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 1995, PENSION FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 4 (1994) (“The
State has not funded the State retirement systems as required by Senate Bill 95.”);
Jennifer Halperin, Netsch Stays Off Cut-The-Waste Bandwagon, ILLINOIS
ISSUES, Nov. 1993, at 16, available at: http://www.lib.niu.edu/1993/ii931116.
html.
[106] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 1995, PENSION
FUNDING REQUIREMENTS 4-5 & App. B (1994) (detailing shortfall in state
contributions versus the statutory funding requirements); ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND
FISCAL COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC RETIREMENT
SYSTEMS 7 1992) (stating that employer contributions are for all of the systems by
Public Act 86-273 with increased contributions phased-in over a seven year period
in FY 1990 to FY 1996, but the statutory language has “historically had little
bearing on the State’s contributions to its pension systems, and the State has yet
to comply with this requirement in any of the three subsequent budget years. On
the contrary, the State’s contributions have been usually determined through the
appropriations process, based on availability of resources, and not according to
statutory requirements. Generally, the State’s pension payments have remained
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about the same for the last five years, amounting to a level-funding
policy.”); ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF
THE ILLINOIS PUBLIC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS 8 1994) (same); Associated Press, Edgar
Signs Measure To Cover Future Pension Debts, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 23,
1994, available at: 1994 WLNR 703595 (stating that the 1989 funding plan was
ignored by governors and lawmakers because of “other budget priorities”).
[107] Using Public Employee Pensions to Balance State and Local Budgets: The
Impact on Public Employees, Retirees, and Taxpayers, Hearing Before Select
Comm. on Aging and Jt. Econ. Comm., Subcomm. on Investment, 102d Cong., 18
(Nov. 20, 1991) (testimony of Dawn Clark Netsch).
[108] Id. at 18, 23-24.
[109] Id. at 17, 24.
[110] See Tim Novak, Illinois Pension Fund At Issue In Campaign, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Apr. 19, 1994, available at: 1994 WLNR 697404.
[111] ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CONDITION OF THE
ILLINOIS PUBLIC RETIREMENT SYSTEMS II-III (1994).
[112] Id.
[113] Rick Pearson, Edgar, Netsch Jostle on Pension Plans, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 19,
1994, available at: 1994 WLNR 4348551.
[114] Id.; Novak, supra note 110.
[115] Novak, supra note 110; Pearson, supra note 113.
[116] Novak, supra note 110; Pearson, supra note 113.
[117] Rick Pearson, Agreement Is Near On Compromise Plan to Bail Out State
Pension, CHI. TRIB., June 21, 1994, available at: 1994 WLNR 4294438; Associated
Press, supra note 106.
[118] Public Act 88-593 (Ill. 1984).
[119] See SEC Order, supra note 85, at 3; ILLINOIS ECONOMIC AND FISCAL
COMMISSION, FISCAL YEAR 1996 PENSION FUNDING REQUIREMENTS at 4 (1995)
[hereinafter 1995 FISCAL REPORT] (same); id. at 16 (“The underfunding of employer
contributions continues to place undue pressure on one other major sources of
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revenue to the retirement systems, namely income from investments. In recent
years the higher-than-assumed rate of return on investments has distorted the fact
that employer contributions have not kept pace with prior, current, and future
estimated benefit costs. In three of the State retirement systems, employee
contributions have exceeded employer contributions for the last several years.”).
[120] SEC Order, supra note 83, at 3; 1995 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 119, at
4; TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 4.
[121] SEC Order, supra note 83, at 3; 1995 FISCAL REPORT, supra note 119, at
4; TOPINKA REPORT, supra note 80, at 4.
[122] See SEC Order, supra note 83, at 3; William G. Holland, Auditor General,
Background Paper: The Five State Retirement Systems at 1 (Mar. 1996).
[123] SEC Order, supra note 83, at 3; see also Holland, supra note 122, at 4.
[124] SEC Order, supra note 83, at 3.
[125] Id.
[126] Examining The Retirement Security of State and Local Government
Employees, Field Hearing, Before H. Comm. on Education and the Workforce,
Subcomm. on Employer-Employee Relations 21-22 (Aug. 30, 2006) (Testimony
of John Filan, Director, Ilinois Governor’s Office of Management and Budget)
(“During the 1970’s, 1980’s, and first half of the 1990’s, state contributions were
grossly inadequate. It increased the unfunded liability every single year, every
adopted budget under-funded the pensions, without exception, during good times
and during bad times. In 1994, the state adopted a payment schedule. That first
became effective in fiscal year 1996. However, the payment schedule continued to
under-fund each of the pension funds each and every year. And would do so until
2034, 40 years later. At that point in time, June 30, 1995, the plans had a total
funded ratio of 52.4 percent, that is assets to liabilities, and an unfunded liability
of $19.5 billion in 1995. . . . The 1995 payment schedule was structurally and
fundamentally flawed when it was enacted. . . . Unfortunately, the 1995 payment
schedule would not decrease the pension debt for 40 years. The $19.5 billion will
not go down, over the next 40 years. Payments were not sufficient to pay normal
costs and interest on unfunded liability until around 2034. Thus, the state was
guaranteed to experience a growing unfunded liability. This had the impact of
deferring and increasing major debt into the future. As a result, the unfunded
liability was originally projected in 1995 to grow from the June 30, 1995 level of
$19.5 billion to more than $70 billion in 2034. The plan was structured that way,
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before it finally reduces to $45 billion in 2045, the last 10 years of the plan, based
on projections done by the actuaries in 1995.”) available at: http://purl.
access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS76243.
[127] SEC Order, supra note 83, at 6-7.
[128] Id. at 4.
[129] Id. at 5.
[130] Id. at 7.
[131] PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48. The Commission on
Government Forecasting and Accountability stated in its testimony before the First
Conference Committee on Senate Bill 1 on June 27, 2013 that the Pension Task
Force Report’s assessment remained correct that state pension contributions were
not forthcoming because the state’s fiscal system failed to generate sufficient
revenue and that the pension system was used as a credit card to fund public
services and stave off the need for tax increases or service cuts. 98th Ill. Gen.
Assem., Proceedings of the First Conference Committee on Senate Bill 1,
Presentation of the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability at
56:44-1:14:01 (June 27, 2013) (on file with author).
[132] PENSION TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 48.
[133] Id.
[134] COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, BRIEFING ON
CAUSES OF STATE PENSION UNFUNDED LIABILITY, PRESENTED TO FIRST CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON SENATE BILL 1, at 5 (June 27, 2013) [hereinafter COGFA BRIEFING] available at: http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/Presentation%206-27-13. pdf. The
remaining 17.5% (or $15.2 billion) in growth in unfunded liabilities is attributable
to “miscellaneous factors,” such as: (a) Retroactive benefit payments for
individuals who delayed applying for retirement, (b) Fewer terminations of vested
employees than expected, (c) Differences between actual cost of benefits earned
and projected costs; (d) Retirements with reciprocal service credits; (e)
Disablements and service retirements other than expected; (f) Delayed reporting
of retirements (effects on pension benefit obligations); and (g) Mortality other than
expected. Id; see also Doug Finke, State of Illinois’ Record of Shorting Pensions
Goes Back Decades, ST. J-REG., Feb. 9, 2013, available at: http://www.sjr.com/top-stories/x846054923/State-of-Illinois-record-of-shorting-pensions-

54

ILLINOIS PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT SUMMER 2014

goes-back-decades (providing a similar summary of the growth of unfunded
liabilities between FY 1985 and FY 2012).
[135] COGFA BRIEFING, supra note 133, at 5.
[136] Id.
[137] Id.
[138] Id.
[139] Id.
[140] See Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 15-19.
[141] Ill. Const. art. XIII, § 5 (emphasis added).
[142] See Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 22, 27, 28, 47-50, 52, 54, 56-57
(relying on floor debates, Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State Univ. Retirement Sys.,
118 Ill.2d 99, 514 N.E.2d 184 (1987); Felt v. Bd. of Trustees Judges Retirement
Sys., 107 Ill.2d 158, 481 N.E.2d 698 (1985); Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees Police Pension
Fund of Village of Niles, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 390 N.E.2d 1281 (1st Dist. 1979)).
[143] Id. at 94-95(relying on Kuhlmann v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police Fund of
Maywood, 106 Ill.App.3d 603, 608, 435 N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1st Dist. 1982)).
[144] Id. at 95 (relying on DiFalco v. Bd. of Trustees of Firemen’s Pension Fund of
Wood Dale Fire Protection Dist., 122 Ill.2d 22, 26, 521 N.E. 2d 923, 925(1988).
[145] Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, at ¶40.
[146] See Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 27 (quoting IV Proceedings
Sixth Ill. Constitutional Convention 2931(1970 (remarks of Delegate Henry Green,
one the principal sponsors of the Pension Clause)); id. at 83 (relying on Kuhlmann
v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police Fund of Maywood, 106 Ill.App.3d 603, 608, 435
N.E.2d 1307, 1311 (1st Dist. 1982) (regarding benefit increases)).
[147] Id. at 23, 30-31, 39, 41, 70-78 (citing People ex. rel. Sklodowski v. State, 182
Ill. 2d 220, 695 N.E.2d 374 (1988); People ex. Rel. Ill. Fed’n of Teachers v.
Lindberg, 60 Ill. 2d 266, 326 N.E.2d 749 (1975); McNamee v. State, 173 Ill. 2d 433,
672 N.E.2d 1159 (1966)).
[148] Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811 at ¶48.
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[149] McNamee v. State, 173 Ill. 2d 433, 442, 672 N.E.2d 1159, 1164 (1996).
[150] Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 74-78 (citing Sklodowski;
McNamee).
[151] Id. at 49-50, 56-57, 69 (citing Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State Univ.
Retirement Sys., 118 Ill.2d 99, 514 N.E.2d 184 (1987); Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees
Police Pension Fund of Village of Niles, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 390 N.E.2d 1281 (1st
Dist. 1979)).
[152] Id.
[153] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 1 as amended by House Amendment Nos.
1, 3 and 4, available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=
1&GAID=12&GA=98&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=68366&SessionID=85&SpecSess
=0.
[154] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 2404 (engrossed version), available
at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=2404&GAID=12&G
A=98&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=74021&SessionID=85.
[155] See e.g., Lynne Marek, Head of Teacher Pension Fund Says State Will Need
To Cut COLAs, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS., Oct. 3, 2012, available at: http://www.chicago
business.com/article/20121003/NEWS02/121009921/head-of-teacher-pensionfund-says-state-will-need-to-cut-colas?template=printart (quoting TRS Executive
Director Dick Ingram, that “25 percent of TRS payments are for cost-of-living
increases on pension benefits.”).
[156] Civic Federation of Chicago, House to Consider Speaker’s Pension Reform
Bill, INSTITUTE FOR ILLINOIS’ FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY (May 2, 2013), http://www.
civicfed.org/civic-federation/blog/house-consider-speaker%E2%80%99s–pensi
on-reform-bill (“Supporters of Speaker Madigan’s approach have argued that the
State retirement systems are currently in such bad shape that pension benefits are
already impaired. Under this idea, a sustainable funding plan could withstand
legal challenges even if it cut benefits because it would aid employees and
retirees. The preamble to the new plan appears to make this legal case for cutting
pension benefits. It describes the State’s financial crisis and steps already taken to
fix it; finds that the health, safety and welfare of Illinois residents is in jeopardy;
and concludes that the fiscal problems cannot be resolved without comprehensive
pension reform.”); see 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Amendment #4 to Senate Bill
1, at 6 (stating that the “General Assembly finds that the reforms in this
amendatory Act of the 98th General Assembly are necessary to address the fiscal
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crisis without incurring severe and irreparable harm to the public
welfare”) available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/fulltext.asp?DocName=0
9800SB0001ham003&GA=98&SessionId=87&DocTypeId=SB&LegID=68366&
DocNum=1&GAID=12&Session=0; 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Proceedings,
May 2, 2013, at 59 (statements of Representative Elaine Nekritz, co-sponsor of
Senate Bill 1) (“I believe we have a very strong case in this Bill before us as to why
this Bill is constitutional. Just as though . . . just like under the First Amendment,
which is a very absolute statement that you’re . . . that freedom of speech cannot
be abridged, you can’t, under that, still be allowed to shout fire in a crowded
theater. And I believe that the courts will not force us, in this instance, to put
pension payments above every other constitutionally required and constitutionally
encouraged priorities that. . . that this state has.”).
[157] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 1 as amended by House Amendment Nos.
1, 3 and 4, available at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum
=1&GAID=12&GA=98&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=68366&SessionID=85&SpecSes
s=0.
[158] See, e.g., 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 2404, at 41-48 (setting forth the
contractual choice framework for GARS members); id. at 71-80 (setting forth the
contractual choice framework for SERS members); id. at 106-14 (setting forth the
contractual choice framework for SURS members); id. at 146-55 (setting forth the
contractual choice framework for TRS members), available at: http://www.il
ga.gov/legislation/98/SB/PDF/09800SB2404eng.pdf.
[159] See 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Proceedings, May 9, 2013, at 15-19
(statements of Senate President John Cullerton, principal sponsor of Senate Bill
2404) (explaining the bill’s contractual framework).
[160] Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State University Retirement Sys., 118 Ill. 2d 99,
104-05, 514 N.E.2d 184, 187 (1987) (noting pension benefits subject to change
under contract principles); Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of
the Village of Niles, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 849-50, 390 N.E.2d 1281, 1293 (1st Dist.
1979) (same).
[161] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 2404 (engrossed version) available
at: http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/billstatus.asp?DocNum=2404&GAID=12&G
A=98&DocTypeID=SB&LegID=74021&SessionID=85.
[162] See Eric M. Madiar, Public Pension Benefits Under Seige: Does State Law
Facilitate or Black Efforts to Cut the Pension Benefits of Public Servants?, 27
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A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 179, 182-83 (2012) (describing the California approach to
public pensions).
[163] See Amanda Vinicky, Pension Conference Committee Progress Report,
Illinois Public Radio Sept. 26, 2013, available at https://will.illinois.edu/news/
story/pension-conference-committee-progress-report; Editorial, Time to Move to
Heart of Stunt: Pension Reform, CHI. SUN-TIMES Sept. 29, 2013, available at:
http://www.suntimes.com/opinions/22828613-474/time-to-move-to-heart-ofstunt-pension-reform.html; Ray Long, Pension Deal Remains Elusive, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 19, 2013, available at:http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-1019/news/ct-met-illinois-pension-reform-veto-session-20131019_1_pension-refo
rm-pension-deal-pension-changes.
[164] See Ray Long & Rick Pearson, Illinois Lawmakers Reach Tentative Deal on
Pension Fix, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 2013, available at: http://www.chicago tribune.
com/news/local/breaking/chi-lawmakers-reach-an-agreement-on-pension-prob
lem-20131127,0,5758411.story; Dave McKinney, Legislative Leaders Strike Deal
on Illinois Pension Reform, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 27, 2013, available at: http://
www.suntimes.com/24032109-761/legislative-leaders-strike-deal-on-illinois-pe
nsion-reform.html; Rick Lyman, Illinois Legislature Approves Retiree Benefit
Cuts in Troubled Pension System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2013, available at: http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/04/us/politics/illinois-legislature-appro ves-benefitcuts-in-troubled-pension-system.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
[165] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 1, at 1-3, available at: http://www.
ilga.gov/legislation/98/SB/PDF/09800SB0001enr.pdf.
[166] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Bill Status, Senate Bill 1, available at: http://www.
ilga.gov/legislation/BillStatus.asp?DocNum=0001&GAID=12&DocTypeID=SB&
LegID=68366&SessionID=87&SpecSess=&Session=0&GA=98.
[167] COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT FORECASTING AND ACCOUNTABILITY, ILLINOIS
STATE RETIREMENT SYSTEMS: FINANCIAL CONDITION as of June 30, 2013, at 34 (Mar.
2014) available at: http://cgfa.ilga.gov/Upload/FinCondILStateRetirementSysF
Y13Mar2014.pdf.
[168] Id.
[169] Id.
[170] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
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[171] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/15-136; 40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[172] 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115.
[173] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[174] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[175] See 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1 (only applying COLA skips to Tier I active members);
40 ILCS 5/14-114 (same); 40 ILCS 5/14-115 (same); 40 ILCS 5/15-136 (same); 40
ILCS 5/16-133.1 (same); 40 ILCS 16-136.1 (same).
[176] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[177] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[178] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[179] 40 ILCS 5/2-119.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-114; 40 ILCS 5/14-115; 40 ILCS 5/15-136;
40 ILCS 5/16-133.1; 40 ILCS 16-136.1.
[180] 40 ILCS 5/2-119; 40 ILCS 5/14-107; 40 ILCS 5/14-110; 40 ILCS 5/15-135; 40
ILCS 5/16-132.
[181] 40 ILCS 5/2-119; 40 ILCS 5/14-107; 40 ILCS 5/14-110; 40 ILCS 5/15-135; 40
ILCS 5/16-132.
[182] 40 ILCS 5/2-119; 40 ILCS 5/14-107; 40 ILCS 5/14-110; 40 ILCS 5/15-135; 40
ILCS 5/16-132.
[183] 40 ILCS 5/2-119; 40 ILCS 5/14-107; 40 ILCS 5/14-110; 40 ILCS 5/15-135; 40
ILCS 5/16-132.
[184] 40 ILCS 5/2-119; 40 ILCS 5/14-107; 40 ILCS 5/14-110; 40 ILCS 5/15-135; 40
ILCS 5/16-132.
[185] 40 ILCS 5/2-108; 40 ILCS 5/2-108.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-103.10; 40 ILCS 5/15111; 40 ILCS 5/16-121.
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[186] 40 ILCS 5/1-160(b-5).
[187] 40 ILCS 5/2-108; 40 ILCS 5/2-108.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-103.10; 40 ILCS 5/15111; 40 ILCS 5/16-121.
[188] 40 ILCS 5/2-108; 40 ILCS 5/2-108.1; 40 ILCS 5/14-103.10; 40 ILCS 5/15111; 40 ILCS 5/16-121.
[189] 40 ILCS 5/15-136(a) (Rule 2); 40 ILCS 5/16-133(a)(A).
[190] 40 ILCS 5/15-136; 40 ILCS 5/16-133.
[191] 40 ILCS 5/15-136(a) (Rule 1); 40 ILCS 5/16-133(a)(B).
[192] STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, TRADITIONAL BENEFIT MEMBER
GUIDE 16 (2013).
[193] 40 ILCS 5/15-136(a) (Rule 2); 40 ILCS 5/16-133(a)(A).
[194] STATE UNIVERSITIES RETIREMENT SYSTEM, TRADITIONAL BENEFIT MEMBER
GUIDE 17 (2013).
[195] Id.
[196] 40 ILCS 5/15-136(c).
[197] 40 ILCS 5/15-157(e).
[198] 40 ILCS 5/15-125(2); UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS BOARD OF TRUSTEES,
RETIREMENT PROGRAMS FOR UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES 4 (2014) (stating that the new
effective rate of interest rate under Public Act 98-0599 would be approximately
4.27%) (on file with author).
[199] 40 ILCS 5/2-125 (2); 40 ILCS 5/2-126; 40 ILCS 5/14-133; 40 ILCS 5/15-157;
40 ILCS 5/16-19.
[200] 40 ILCS 5/15-125 (2); 40 ILCS 5/2-126; 40 ILCS 5/14-133; 40 ILCS 5/15157; 40 ILCS 5/16-152.
[201] 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Proceedings, Dec. 3, 2013, at 17 (statements
of Speaker Madigan, principal House sponsor of Senate Bill 1) (stating that the
“reduction in the employee contribution was put into the Bill as part of the items
of consideration that were put into the Bill for purposes of the arguments before
the Illinois Supreme Court.”); id. at 53.
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[202] See Diederich Ins. Agency, LLC v. Smith, 2011 IL App (5th) 100048, at ¶5,
962 N.E.2d 165, 167 (finding that the employer’s reduction in the duration of an
existing non-solicitation agreement from 2 years to 1 year was not legal
consideration to support a new non-solicitation agreement the employee entered
into because the employee “was already obligated to not compete against” the
employer); Ross v. May Co., 377 Ill.App.3d 387, 392, 880 N.E.2d 210, 215 (1st Dist.
2007) (finding that although an employer had offered an employee additional
benefits such as paid personal days, disability insurance and a retirement savings
plan, these additional benefits were offered to all employees and were not part of
a bargained-for exchange with the employee to support a modification of the
employer’s binding employee handbook).
[203] 40 ILCS 5/2-124; 40 ILCS 5/14-131; 40 ILCS 5/15-155; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.
[204] 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40 ILCS 5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2.
[205] Compare 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., Senate Bill 2404, at 53, 85, 127, and
173 available at:http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/98/SB/PDF/09800SB2404en
g.pdf (making the state “contractually obligated” to make pension contributions
under the 1995 funding plan) with 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40 ILCS
5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2 (lacking such language).
[206] See 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Proceedings, Dec. 3, 2013, at 31-32
(colloquy between House Speaker Madigan, principal House sponsor of Senate Bill
1, and Representative Fortner where Representative Fortner asked with respect to
the “funding guarantee” whether “the Legislature would still have the power
through the statutory process “ to “change the number that would be required for
us to pay[?]” and the House Speaker answered, “The answer is yes.”).
[207] 30 ILCS 122/20; 30 ILCS 122/25; 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40
ILCS 5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2.
[208] 30 ILCS 122/20; 30 ILCS 122/25; 40 ILCS 5/2-125; 40 ILCS 5/14-132; 40
ILCS 5/15-156; 40 ILCS 5/16-158.2.
[209] See 98th Ill. Gen. Assemb., House Proceedings, Dec. 3, 2013, at 31-33
(colloquy between House Speaker Madigan, principal House sponsor of Senate Bill
1, and Representative Fortner regarding payment amounts).
[210] 40 ILCS 5/2-165; 40 ILCS 5/14-155; 40 ILCS 5/15-200; 40 ILCS 5/16-205;
40 ILCS 5/20-121; 40 ILCS 5/123; 40 ILCS 5/20-124; 40 ILCS 5/20-125.
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[211] 40 ILCS 5/2-165; 40 ILCS 5/14-155; 40 ILCS 5/15-200; 40 ILCS 5/16-205.
[212] 40 ILCS 5/7-109; 40 ILCS 5/15-106; 40 ILCS 5/16-106.
[213] 40 ILCS 5/7-116; 40 ILCS 5/7-139; 40 ILCS 5/9-219; 40 ILCS 5/9-220; 40
ILCS 5/14-104.3; 40 ILCS 5/14-106; 40 ILCS 5/15-112; 40 ILCS 5/15-113.4; 40
ILCS 5/16-121; 40 ILCS 5/16-127; 40 ILCS 5/17-134.
[214] 5 ILCS 315/7.5.
[215] Id.
[216] Complaint, Heaton v. Quinn, No. 2013 CH 28406 (Cir. Ct. Cook County);
Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Employees
Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County);
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1 (Cir. Ct.
Sangamon County); Harrison v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 48 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon
County) [hereinafter “We Are One Complaint”]; State Universities Annuitants’
Ass’n v. State Universities Retirement System, 2014 MR 207 (Cir. Ct. Champaign
County) [hereinafter “SUAA Complaint”].
[217] Complaint, Heaton v. Quinn, No. 2013 CH 28406 (Cir. Ct. Cook County);
Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Employees
Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County);
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1 (Cir. Ct.
Sangamon County); We Are One Complaint; SUAA Complaint.
[218] The complaints were filed in circuit courts in Cook, Sangamon (7th Judicial
District), and Champaign (6th Judicial District) Counties.
[219] Complaint, Heaton v. Quinn, No. 2013 CH 28406 (Cir. Ct. Cook County);
Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State Employees
Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon County);
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1 (Cir. Ct.
Sangamon County); We Are One Complaint.
[220] Order Granting Motion for Consolidation and Transfer from the Circuit
Court of Sangamon County, In Re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 CH 48
(Mar 3, 2014).
[221] Id.
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[222] Order Granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction, In Re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1 (May 15, 2014).
[223] We Are One Complaint, at 52-54; SUAA Complaint, at 14.
[224] Complaint, Ill. State Employees Ass’n v. Bd. of Trustees of the State
Employees Retirement System, No. 2014 CH 3, at 12-13 (Cir. Ct. Sangamon
County)
[hereinafter
“State
Employees
Association
Compliant”];
Complaint, Retired State Employees Ass’n v. Quinn, No. 2014 CH 1, at 24-26 (Cir.
Ct. Sangamon County) [hereinafter "Retired State Employees Association
Complaint”].
[225] State Employees Association Complaint at 27-29; Retired State Employees
Association Complaint at 17-19.
[226] Retired State Employees Association Complaint at 14-17.
[227] See e.g., We Are One Complaint at 43-45.
[228] We Are One Complaint, at 41.
[229] Id. at 34-44.
[230] Id. at 40.
[231] Id.
[232] SUAA Complaint, at 19-20; SUAA Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 6-8.
[233] SUAA Complaint, at 19-20; SUAA Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 6-8,10-13.
[234] SUAA Complaint, at 20-21.
[235] SUAA Motion for Injunctive Relief, at 7-8.
[236] Id.
[237] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 61 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No.
2014 MR 1, at 59 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State Employees
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 33 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired
Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
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Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 17 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired
State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 21 (May 15, 2014).
[238] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No.
2014 MR 1, at 28-29 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired Teachers
Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014
MR 1, at 4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired State Employees
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 10-11 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State
Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 8 (May 15, 2014).
[239] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation,No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No.
2014 MR 1, at 28-29 (May 15, 2014).
[240] Answer and Defenses to We Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 28-30 (May 15,
2014).
[241] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 61 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No.
2014 MR 1, at 59-60 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State Employees
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 33-34 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to
Retired Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 17-18 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to
Retired State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re:
Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 21-22 (May 15, 2014).
[242] Answer and Defenses to We Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 60 (May 15, 2014).
[243] See e.g., Answer and Defenses to We Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 28 (May 15, 2014)
(denying “members of SERS and SURS are entitled to 3% automatic annuity
increases, but admiting that the Pension Code in effect immediately prior to June
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1, 2014 provided that retired members of SERS, SURS, and TRS would receive each
year a 3% automatic annuity increase to their pension amount, compounded.”).
[244] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No.
2014 MR 1, at 28-29 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired Teachers
Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014
MR 1, at 4 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired State Employees
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 10-11 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State
Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 4 (May 15, 2014).
[245] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 3-4 (May 15, 2014).
[246] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 59 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We Are
One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No.
2014 MR 1, at 57(May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired Teachers
Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014
MR 1, at 15 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired State Employees
Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 19 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to State
Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 31 (May 15, 2014).
[247] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 59-64 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We
Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57-62 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to
Retired Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 15-20 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to
Retired State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re:
Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 19-24 (May 15, 2014); Answer and
Defenses to State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In
re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 30-36 (May 15, 2014).
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[248] Answer and Defenses to “We Are One” Complaint, Illinois Attorney
General, In re: Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57-58 (May 15,
2014).
[249] Id.
[250] Id. at 58-59.
[251] Id.
[252] Answer and Defenses to SUAA Complaint, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 64-65 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to We
Are One Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 57(May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired
Teachers Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension Reform
Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 20 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses to Retired
State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re: Pension
Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 23-24 (May 15, 2014); Answer and Defenses
to State Employees Association Complaint, Illinois Attorney General, In re:
Pension Reform Litigation, No. 2014 MR 1, at 35-36 (May 15, 2014).
[253] Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, No. 2014 MR 1 (June 25, 2014). A separate motion for
summary judgment was filed by counsel for the Illinois State Employees
Association and Retired State Employees’ Association arguing that Public Act 980599 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Illinois Constitution by not
applying the Act’s benefit cuts to judges. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, No. 2014 MR 1 (June. 25, 2014).
[254] Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment, No. 2014 MR 1, 1-23 (June 29, 2014).
[255] Case Management Order, No. 2014 MR 1 (June 30, 2014).
[256] Doug Finke, Judge:Insurance Ruling Will Factor Into Pension Reform
Decision, ST. J. REG., Sept. 4, 2014, available at: http://www.sj-r.com/article/20
140904/NEWS/140909736; Order, No. 2014 MR 1 (Sept. 4, 2014).
[257] Sidley Austin LLP, Memorandum, The General Assembly’s Authority to
Enact Comprehensive Pension Reform Legislation: A Response to Eric Madiar
(April 11, 2011) Mavailable at: docstoc.com/docs/96732951/April-THEGENERAL-ASSEMBLY-AUTHORITY-TO-ENACT [hereinafter “Sidley Police
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Power Memo”]; Eric M. Madiar, Is Welching on Public Pension Promises an
Option for Illinois? An Analysis of Article XIII, Section 5 of the Illinois Constitution
(Mar. 1, 2011), available at:http://ssrn.com/abstract=1774163.
[258] Sidley Police Power Memo, supra note 257, at 2-3, 31-32, 37-41.
[259] Id. at 2-3, 12-14, 30-59.
[260] Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 82-84, 96-98, 120-124.44.
[261] Id. at 47-49 (citing IV Proceedings 2931.
[262] IV Proceedings 2929-2930 (statements of Delegate Whalen; see also IV
Proceedings 2930-31 (statements of Delegates Weisberg, Davis, and Bottino,
opponents of the Clause, agreeing with Delegate Whalen’s view that pension
benefits should only be protected under the Illinois Constitution’s Contract
Clause).
[263] See Buddell v. Bd. of Trustees, State Universities Retirement Sys., 118 Ill. 2d
99, 102, 514 N.E.2d 184, 186 (1987).
[264] Felt v. Bd. of Trustees Judges Retirement Sys., 107 Ill.2d 158, 481 N.E.2d
698 (1985) (quoting IV Proceedings 2929) (statement of Delegate Kinney).
[265] Kanerva v, Weems, 2104 IL 115811, at ¶48.
[266] Felt, 107 Ill.2d at 167, 481 N.E.2d at 703: Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees of the
Police Pension Fund of the Village of Niles, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 851, 390 N.E.2d
1281, 1294(1st Dist. 1979).
[267] See Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 22 (expressly subjecting “the right of the
individual citizen to keep and bear arms” to the “police power”); Kalodimos v.
Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill.2d 483, (1984) (noting that the 1970
Constitutional Convention created an individual right to bear arms that is
expressly “subject only to the police power”); Quilici v. Village of Morton
Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).
[268] Kanerva v, Weems, 2104 IL 115811, at ¶41.
[269] See Maddox v. Blagojevich, 233 Ill.2d 508, 522, 911 N.E.2d 979, 988 (2009)
(“The constitution operates as a limitation upon the General Assembly’s sweeping
authority, not as any grant of power [citation]; thus the General Assembly is free
to enact any legislation that the constitution does not expressly
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prohibit[.]”); O’Brien v. White, 219 Ill.2d 86, 100, 846 N.E.2d 116, 124 (2006)
(explaining, “the General Assembly cannot enact legislation that conflicts with
specific provisions of the constitution, unless the constitution specifically grants
the legislature that authority”); People v. Adams, 149 Ill.2d 331, 339-40, 597
N.E.2d 574, 579 (1992) (“the police power may not be used to violate a positive
constitutional mandate”); Greenfield v. Russel, 292 Ill.392, 399, 127 N.E. 102, 105
(1920) (“Our Legislature possesses every power not delegated to some other
department of the state or to the federal government or not denied to it by the
Constitution of the state or of the United States.”); Town of Lake View v. The Rose
Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 197 (1873) (“It has been said, the source of [the police
power] may be readily recognized as flowing from the people in their organized
capacity, inalienable in its character, but it is difficult to define its boundaries or
limit its operations. We are unwilling, however, to concede the existence of an
indefinable power, superior to the constitution, that may be invoked whenever the
legislature may deem the public exigency may require it[.]”); see also Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876) (“When the people of the United Colonies separated
from Great Britain, they changed the form, but not the substance, of their
government. They retained for the purposes of government all the powers of the
British Parliament, and through their State constitutions, or other forms of social
compact, undertook to give practical effect to such as they deemed necessary for
the common good and security of life and property. All the powers which they
retained committed to their respective States, unless in express terms or by
implication reserved to themselves. Subsequently, when it was found necessary
to establish a national government for national purposes, a part of the powers of
the States and of the people of the States was granted to the United States and the
people of the United States. This grant operated as a further limitation upon the
States, so that now the governments of the States possess all the powers of
Parliament of England, except such as have been delegated to the United States or
reserved to the people. The reservations by the people are shown in the
prohibitions of the constitutions.”) (emphasis added); Parkway Bank & Trust Co.
v. City of Darien, 43 Ill.App.3d 400, 406, 357 N.E.2d 211, 217 (2d Dist. 1976) (“the
State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater restrictions on the police
power than those held to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards”).
[270] Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82 (1897).
[271] IV Proceedings 2931 (Delegate Green); see also Peters v. City of Springfield,
57 Ill.2d 142, 151, 311 N.E.2d 107, 112 (1974) (concluding that the Clause was
intended to ensure that the pension benefits of public employees could “not be
defeated by reason of the failure to provide necessary funding”).
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[272] Home Bldg. & Loan v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426-444 (1934); id. at 439
(stating that the State’s “reserved power cannot be construed as to destroy the
limitation [of the Contract Clause], nor is the limitation to construed to destroy the
reserved power in its essential aspects. They must be construed in harmony with
each other.”); id. at 443 (same).
[273] Id. at 426-444.
[274] General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187-89 (1992).
[275] People v. Caballas, 221 Ill.2d 282, 313, 851 N.E.2d 26, 45 (Ill. 2006).
[276] Id.
[277] Madiar Pension Article, supra note 2, at 94-95.
[278] Id.
[279] See IV Proceedings 2926-2931.
[280] IV Proceedings 2931.
[281] IV Proceeding 2926 (statements of Delegate Kinney) (“It is definitely the
intent that an increase in benefits would not be precluded. Many states tie their
pension and retirement benefits into a cost of living and raise them from time to
time. It is the intent that this amendment would permit so doing if the legislature
at some future time should decide to do so.”).
[282] Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811 at ¶¶39-40.
[283] Schroeder v. Morton Grove Police Pension Bd., 219 Ill. App. 3d 697, 701-02,
579 N.E.2d 997, 1000-01 (1st Dist. 1991); Kuhlmann v. Bd. of Trustees of the
Police Fund of Maywood, 106 Ill. App. 3d 603, 607-608, 435 N.E.2d 1307, 131011 (1st Dist. 1982).
[284] People ex rel. Merchants’ Savings, Loan & Trust Co. v. Auditor of Public
Accounts, 30 Ill. 434, 435-38 (1863).
[285] Cornelius, supra note 20, at 35, 44.
[286] JOHN H. KRENKEL, ILLINOIS INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS: 1818-1848 at 149
(1958), available at:https://archive.org/download/illinois internal 00kren/illin
oisinternal00kren.pdf (last visited July 24, 2014). In 1841, the State defaulted on
annual interest payments it owed on the internal improvement debts, which
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totaled over $10.5 million. That indebtedness was described as “almost
insurmountable” because the State’s annual interest payment was nearly
$800,000, but the State only collected about $98,500 a year in revenue for general
government expenses. Id. Efforts to repudiate these debts were blocked by
Governor Thomas Ford in 1842 who succeeded in forcing the State “to assume its
responsibilities and save its credit.”
Cornelius, supra note 21, at
27. KRENKEL supra at 178-90; Theodore Pease. The Frontier State: 18181848, in THE CENTENNIAL HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 316-27 (1918) available at: https://
archive.org/download/frontierstate18100peas/frontierstate18100peas.pdf. The
State did not pay off its internal improvement debts until the
1880s. KRENKEL supra note 286, at 215-16.
[287] Cornelius, supra note 20, at 27, 35, 44; KRENKEL, supra note 286, at 209210 (describing the drafting history of Article XV at the 1847 Illinois Constitutional
Convention); People ex rel. Merchants’ Saving, Loan & Trust Co., 30 Ill. at 439440 (detailing Article XV’s purpose and background).
[288] 1861 Illinois Laws at 208.
[289] Id. at 208-09; People ex rel. Merchants’ Saving, Loan & Trust Co., 30 Ill. at
436-38.
[290] People ex rel. Merchants’ Saving, Loan & Trust Co., 30 Ill. at 437.
[291] Id. at 439-445.
[292] Id. at 440.
[293] Id.
[294] Id. at 444.
[295] Id. at 445.
[296] Henry Ford, Interview by Charles N. Wheeler in the CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1916
appearing in CLIFTON FADIMAN, THE LITTLE BROWN BOOK OF ANECDOTES 213 (1995).
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
By, Student Editorial Board:

PETER BRIERTON, CHRISTINA JACOBSON, AND IAN JONES
Recent Developments is a regular feature of the Illinois Public Employee Relations
Report. It highlights recent legal developments of interest to the public
employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the
public employee collective bargaining statutes, The First Amendment and the
Illinois Constitution.
I. IELRB DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Bargaining Units

In Uni Faculty Organizations, IEA-NEA and Board of Trustees of the University
of Illinois, Case No. 2013-RC-0008-S, 30 PERI ¶299 (IELRB 2014), the IELRB
affirmed an Administrative Law Judge decision that a bargaining unit of faculty at
Uni High School, a laboratory high school affiliated with the University of Illinois,
was appropriate. The faculty at Uni High who were seeking representation were
considered, under the university statutes, to be “nontenure-track faculty
members” of the University.
The IELRB observed that the petitioned-for unit was not one listed in its
regulations setting forth presumptively appropriate units for the University of
Illinois. Under those regulations, the unit could still be appropriate if the union
seeking the unit could establish by clear and convincing evidence that:
1. the unit is otherwise appropriate under section 7 of the Illinois Educational
Labor Relations Act;
2. special circumstances and compelling justifications make it appropriate for the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board to establish a unit different from those
set forth [in the regulations];
3. establishment of a different unit will not cause undue fragmentation of
bargaining units or proliferation of bargaining units. Undue fragmentation of
bargaining units or proliferation of bargaining units is such as to threaten to
interrupt services, cause labor instability, and cause continual collective
bargaining and a multitude of representation proceedings.
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The IELRB found the unit appropriate under section 7 because the Uni faculty
shared a community of interest. The IELRB relied on, among many things, the fact
that Uni High faculty members reported to individuals at Uni High, not the
University, Uni High faculty were subject to a different evaluation process than are
University faculty, and Uni High faculty members taught secondary education
rather than higher education. The IELRB relied on these factors plus a distinct
school year and distinct school day for Uni faculty as well as different funding
sources for Uni High School and the rest of the University to establish significant
differences between Uni High faculty and University faculty. Further, the IELRB
determined that, because of the differences between Uni High and the rest of the
University, any labor dispute would be “physically and otherwise limited to Uni
High School” if the IELRB were to approve the bargaining unit as appropriate.
Accordingly, the IELRB found no evidence that allowing Uni High faculty
members to collectively bargain would cause undue fragmentation of the
bargaining unit or put any strain on the labor relations process.
B.

Protected Activity

In Amy Whiting-Singer and Mid-Valley Special Education Cooperative, Case No.
2013-CA-0077-C, 30 PERI ¶ 297 (IELRB 2014), the IELRB held that allegations
that Mid-Valley Special Education Cooperative violated Section 14(a) of the IELRA
by terminating Whiting-Singer in retaliation for advocating, on behalf of her
students, that her employer follow “federal and state laws related to educating
individuals with disabilities” fell outside the IELRB’s jurisdiction. The IELRB held
that advocating on the behalf of students was not protected activity under the Act.
Section 3 of the IELRA guarantees employees the right to engage in concerted
activity for mutual aid and protection. The IELRB emphasized that WhitingSinger never advocated on behalf of other employees. Her alleged advocacy for
students fell outside of Section 3. Accordingly the IELRB found the charge to be
outside its jurisdiction and dismissed the charge.
II. IPLRA DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Subjects of Bargaining

In SEIU Local 73 and City of Chicago, No. L-CA 10-061. 31 PERI ¶ 3 (ILRB Local
Panel, 2014), the ILRB held that the use of hidden cameras to discipline employees
was a mandatory subject of bargaining and, therefore, the City of Chicago violated
Sections 10(a)(4) and (1) of the IPLRA when the City failed to notify and negotiate
with SEIU.
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After a series of break-ins at the West Pullman Library, the City installed two
hidden surveillance cameras on the premises to help the police department capture
intruders. The City did not notify the bargaining unit employees about the
installation of the cameras, did not bargain with the Union about the installation
and used the footage from the cameras to discipline bargaining unit employees.
The Local Panel concluded that the use of cameras for this purpose amounted to a
unilateral change in a mandatory subject of bargaining without granting notice to
the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative. The ILRB distinguished
between the use of cameras for the exclusive reason to capture intruders, which
would be a permissive subject of bargaining, and the use of the cameras to
discipline employees as being a mandatory subject of bargaining.
The ILRB noted that although the city installed the cameras to catch an intruder,
the city did not limit the scope of the surveillance when it placed the cameras in
places that monitored bargaining unit employees. The ILRB also found it
convincing that the conduct of bargaining unit employees was recorded 24 hours
a day and 7 days a week. The ILRB reasoned further that the use of cameras to
catch intruders wasn’t the only reason the city installed the cameras. The ILRB
found it persuasive that subsequently the City disciplined an employee for
damaging a copy machine after seeing the employee’s behavior on footage from the
cameras. The Local Panel reasoned that if the City only intended to catch intruders,
it could have informed the Union, installed visible cameras, and only recorded
when no one was in the building (which was when the previous break-ins
occurred).
III. FIRST AMENDMENT DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Fair Share Fees

In Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), the Supreme Court held that the State
of Illinois and SEIU Healthcare Illinois & Indiana violated the First Amendment
rights of personal assistants who provide in home services for Medicaid recipients
and who were not members of the union when it compelled them to pay fair share
fees to the union, representing their share of the costs of representation. The Court
held that its prior decision in Abood v. Detroit v. Detroit Board of Education, 431
U.S. 209 (1977) which had upheld the constitutionality of fair share fees confined
to the non-member of the union’s pro rata share of expenditures germane to the
union’s collective representation functions. The Court questioned the continuing
validity of Abood, observing that the line drawn in that case between union
political and ideological expenditures, which could not constitutionally be charged
to non-members, and expenditures germane to collective bargaining which may
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be charged has turned out not to be a very bright line as issues of public employee
compensation have captured the limelight in public discourse. While not
revisiting Abood in this case, the Court confined its holding to “full fledged” public
employees. It held Abood inapplicable to the personal assistants who it
characterized as employees of the State only for purposes of collective bargaining
but are otherwise employees of the Medicaid recipients who receive their services.
B.

Free Speech

In Lane v. Franks, 134 S. Ct. 2369 (2004), the Supreme Court held that a public
employee’s sworn testimony given under subpoena is citizen speech, eligible for
First Amendment protection. The Court clarified its prior decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), which had held that speech made as an employee is
not entitled to First Amendment protection against adverse employment action.
In 2006, Lane was hired by Central Alabama Community College (CACC) as the
Director of Community Intensive Training for Youth (“CITY”). Lane conducted an
audit of the program’s expenses. The audit found that Suzanne Schmitz, an
Alabama State Representative, was on the CITY payroll but not reporting to the
CITY office or performing any work. Despite warnings from the CACC president
and its attorney, Lane terminated Schmitz for failure to perform her work duties.
Following Schmitz’s termination, the FBI conducted an investigation of her
employment with CITY. Lane testified before a federal grand jury regarding his
reasons for terminating Schmitz. In August 2008, Lane also testified under
subpoena at Schmitz’s criminal trial. Lane was terminated in January 2009.
He filed suit against Franks, his supervisor, alleging that Franks retaliated against
him for his testimony against Schmitz in violation of the First Amendment.
The district court granted Frank’s motion for summary judgment, despite genuine
issues of material fact concerning Frank’s motivation. Relying on Garcetti, the
district court found that there was no clear violation because Lane’s speech was
part of his official job duties. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Frank was
entitled to qualified immunity in his personal capacity because Lane’s free speech
right was not clearly established in the law. The Eleventh Circuit also found “that
Lane spoke as an employee and not as a citizen because he was acting pursuant to
his official duties when he investigated Schmitz’s employment.”
The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court defined the
issue as whether a public employee’s “truthful subpoenaed testimony, outside the
course of their ordinary job responsibilities” was protected by the First
Amendment.
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The Court distinguished Garcetti, as holding that an “internal memorandum
prepared by a prosecutor in the course of his ordinary job responsibility
constituted unprotected employee speech.” In contrast, the Court found that
Lane’s speech was not within the scope of his employment duties, even though
Lane acquired the information for his testimony in the course of his employment.
The Court emphasized the importance that truthful testimony under oath by a
public employee, regardless of any official obligations, also carries an obligation
as a citizen to render sworn testimony which sets it apart from speech made purely
in the capacity of an employee.
The Court turned to the two-part inquiry regarding citizen speech: (1) did the
speech involve matters of public concern, and (2) did the government have an
adequate justification, as an employer, for treating the employee differently than
the public at large. The court found that Lane’s testimony regarding “corruption in
a public program and misuse of state funds” to be “a matter of significant public
concern.” Further, the Court noted that such a substantial matter of public concern
created an exceedingly high bar for the government to attempt to justify their
actions. In light of the truthful nature of Lane’s testimony, and the significance of
the issue at hand, the Court found Lane’s speech entitled to protection under the
First Amendment.
The Court, however, affirmed the Eleventh Circuit’s finding that Franks in his
individual capacity was entitled to qualified immunity from damages because of
the lack of clear precedent in the Eleventh Circuit at the time Franks terminated
Lane.
IV. ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Pension Clause

In Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, the Illinois Supreme Court held that “the
State’s provision of health insurance premium subsidies for retirees is a benefit of
membership in a pension or retirement system within the meaning of Article XIII,
Section 5, of the Illinois Constitution, and a statute that allowed for reduced
subsidies for health insurance of retirees and their beneficiaries violates the State
Constitution. Article XIII, Section 5 provides that that “[m]embership in any
pension or retirement system of the State . . . shall be an enforceable contractual
relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or impaired.” The court,
reasoned that the health insurance subsidies are benefits of membership in the
retirement system. The court further reasoned that, based on the clear language in
Article XIII, Section 5, the language was intended to include subsidized health care
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benefits. Further, the court stated that if the constitution’s drafters had wanted to
only protect annuity benefits they could have so specified, however they did not.

